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"WE INSIST! FREEDOM NOW"t:
DOES CONTRACT DOCTRINE HAVE ANYTHING
CONSTITUTIONAL TO SAY?
Hila Keren*
On a daily basis countless people are refused contracts due to discrimination on
account of their "Othemess "--their race, their disability, their gender, etc. Many of
them are not welcomed by hotels, denied service in restaurants, rejected by banks
when asking for a mortgage loan, and so on. The variety of transactions that are
denied and the breadth of human interaction that they affect are simply
overwhelming and result in afundamental exclusion from the marketplace.
For years contract law has ignored this problem, while exclusive responsibility for
contractual discrimination has been reserved for constitutional law and the
antidiscrimination statutes that were enacted to fulfill egalitarian ideals. This Article
attempts to break the contractual silence and to bridge the huge gap between
discrimination and contracts by pressing up against traditional legal boundaries.
Drawing on a broad understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment, as a promise of
an egalitarian and mobile economy which heavily relies on contracts, the Article calls
for addressing the problem of precontractual discrimination with contractual tools.
Such a possibility has until now remained by and large unexplored, but as this
Article seeks to show, it is an achievable and powerful step that can be well-
integrated into up-to-date contract theory.
t Max Roach's protest album "We Insist! Freedom Now Suite" (Candid/Columbia,
1960) is one of the defining statements of America's Black civil rights movement. The
adoption of Roach's album-title here reflects the theme of this Article-the insistence on
the urgent need to take better care of the freedom TO contract in order to ensure more
equality.
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The Article first exposes the detachment between contract doctrine and the scattered
antidiscrimination norms and analyzes the harmful consequences of this detachment.
It then creates an original meeting point between the two bodies of law, one of which
is intentionally located within contract doctrine. This point is found by dismantling
the dominant concept of "freedom OF contact", and especially by defining and
establishing the freedom to make a contract.
The novel insistence on the 'freedom TO contract," which gives the Article its
name, is to be enforced, as proposed, through the duty to negotiate in good faith.
Breaking contractual negotiations for discriminatory reasons, it is argued, should be
seen as illegitimate business behavior, as an overt expression of bad faith that carries
liability. One basis for imposing such precontractual liability can be found by
applying to the issue of discrimination the "no-retraction" principle that was recently
developed within the economic school of thought. Such reasoning is part of a more
general effort to go beyond the opposition between equality and freedom by
answering affirmatively the question raised by the Articles' title: contract law has
something constitutional to say and it is the commitment and enforcement of the
essential freedom to contract.
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"The subject of 'Freedom of Contract and Constitutional Law' has
provoked little discussion in the United States."
-E.Allan Farnsworth, 19981
INTRODUCTION
Jackie Robinson was an extraordinary baseball player, but until 1947
he, like every other Black player before him, was not allowed to play in
the Major Leagues.2 The team owners refused to contract with him be-
cause of his race. Later, when he traveled with his team, the Brooklyn
Dodgers, he was often not allowed into the hotels where his White
teammates spent the night. The hotel owners refused to contract with
Blacks.3 Stories of this type are all too frequently told in past tense, often
opening with words such as "once upon a time," as if to soothingly
1. E. Allan Farnsworth, Freedom of Contract and Constitutional Law: United States
Report, in FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 261,261 (Alfredo Mordechai
Rabello & Petar Sarcevic eds., 1998). In the memory of Prof. Farnsworth who passed
during the final stages of writing, this Article is a humble attempt to break this silence.
2. See generally American Treasures of the Library of Congress, http://
www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/tri042.htmnl (last visited Nov. 11, 2005); The Jackie Rob-
inson Foundation, http://www.jackierobinson.org/aboutjackie/imdexO3.htm (last visited
Nov. 11,2005).
3. See PETER GOLENBOCK, ThAMmAT s (1990).
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indicate the anachronistic nature of the reality related therein.4 This is a
misleading tone. Decades have passed but discrimination is still here with
us, stubbornly surviving years of social and legal combat.
On a daily basis, countless people are refused contracts due to dis-
crimination on account of their "Otherness"-their race, their disability,
their gender, etc. Like Jackie Robinson, many of them, even today, are not
welcomed by hotels, 5 cannot hail a taxi,6 and sit in restaurants waiting in
vain to be served.' Others, looking for an apartment, call in response to
advertisements and set up appointments, only to be falsely told, when
their "Otherness" is discovered, that the apartment has already been
4. See, e.g., id. This is a children's book that, as such, has endless educational influ-
ence. The opening line of the book reads: "Once upon a time in America, when
automobiles were black and looked like tanks and laundry was white and hung on
clotheslines to dry .... "
5. See, e.g., Gilliam v. HBE Corp. d/b/a Adam's Mark Hotels, 204 FR.D. 493 (M.D.
Fla. 2000). In this litigation, the HBE Corporation, which operates 21 Adam's Mark Ho-
tels and Resorts throughout the country, was sued for racial discrimination. The U.S.
government's complaint alleged a pattern of denial of the full enjoyment by non-White
persons of services, facilities and accomodations offered by the Adam's Mark hotel
throughout the country. The case was settled on December 2001. For the case summary
see http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/casesummary.htm (last visited Nov.
11,2005).
6. See, e.g., Bolden v.J&P, Inc., 37 Fed. Appx. 543 (D.D.C. 2002). In this case, Joel
Bolden, an African American, and Len Silvia, a Caucasian, sought to share a taxicab ride
from a restaurant to their apartment in Georgetown.The driver pulled over and stopped to
pick up Mr. Silvia, but when he saw Mr. Bolden approach the cab as well, he started to
drive away, at the exact moment Mr. Silvia was attempting to get into the cab. Mr. Silvia
was eventually able to enter the cab, as was Mr. Bolden, who chased after the cab as it was
dragging his friend up. The driver told Mr. Silvia, "I take you, but not him." The driver
further refused to stop the cab to allow Mr. Bolden to summon police assistance, and ulti-
mately refused to take them to their home. The litigation is reported by the Washington
Lawyer's Committee as a significant and precedential victory since "[r]ace discrimination
in the provision of taxicab service within the District of Columbia is a severe and wide-
spread problem that largely has been unremedied through civil rights litigation." Public
Accommodations Project, http://www.washlaw.org/projects/public-accomodations/
default.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2005); see also Danita L. Davis, Note, Taxi! Why Hailing a
New Idea about Public Accommodation Laws May Be Easier than Hailing a Taxi, 37 VA. U. L.
REV. 929 (2003).
7. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Waffle House, Inc. 347 E Supp. 2d 249 (WD.N.C. 2004). In
this case, the plaintiff,, an interracial couple, decided to dine at the defendant restaurant,
but sat at the counter and then in a booth for 45 minutes and were not offered service by
the restaurant's waitresses, while White individuals entering after them were offered ser-
vice, ordered, and were served their food by the same waitresses in the same period of
time. It is one of a series of lawsuits initiated by The Washington Lawyers' Committee,
along with co-counsel, against Waffle House Inc., and in certain cases Waffle House fran-
chisees, on behalf of individuals who allege they were discriminated against on the basis of
race while attempting to patronize various Waffle House restaurants in North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Georgia. See also THE WASHINGTON LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS AND URBAN AFFAIRS, FALL 2004 UPDATE, available at http://www.washlaw.org/
news/update/default.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
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rented.8 Similarly, some are rejected by banks when asking for a mortgage
loan,9 or cannot buy homeowner's insurance. 0
A more recent example that will be used throughout this Article is
the case of Jesse Williams, a student who had just moved to Virginia and
"attempted to purchase a printer cartridge at the Staples office supply and
photocopying store in Winchester, Virginia."" The Staples clerk refused to
accept Williams' out-of-state (Maryland) check and he had to leave the
store without making the purchase. When Williams related the story to a
few of his university classmates, his friend Heather Hutchinson told him
that on that same day she had paid at Staples with her out-of-state check
(also from Maryland), and no one had refused her check. Williams is
Black, his friend is White. Testers were sent to Staples and the story re-
peated itself.
12
The variety of transactions that are denied and the breadth of human
interaction that they affect are simply overwhelming. The result can be an
8. See, e.g., John Baugh, Linguistic Profiling, in BLACK LINGUISTICS: LANGUAGE, SOCI-
ETY, AND POLITICS IN AFRICA AND THE AMERICAS 155, 158-59 (Sinfree Makoni et al. eds.,
2003) ("I moved to Palo Alto first in search of accommodations that would serve my en-
tire family. Any reader who has ever tried to rent a home or apartment knows the
experience of scouring the classified advertisements and then calling to make an appoint-
ment. During all calls to prospective landlords, I explained my circumstances, as a visiting
professor at [Stanford], always employing my 'professional voice,' which I am told 'sounds
[W]hite.' No prospective landlord ever asked me about my 'race,' but in four instances I
was abruptly denied access to housing upon arrival for my scheduled appointment."); see
also Dawn L. Smalls, Linguistic Profiling and the Law, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 579, 582
(2004) (quoting Baugh, supra, and adding: "Baugh is more skilled than most. Most African
Americans do not have the ability to 'sound [W]hite' and thereby elude linguistic profiling.
A more typical experience is recounted by a 1994 study by Feagin and Sykes. 'She called
and they told her that the apartment was rented. And she called [a friend] on the phone
and said "I'd like for you to call them ... because you sound like a [W]hite person." And
the friend called and the apartment was still unrented.' ").
9. See, e.g., United States v. Albank, No. 97 Civ. 1206 (N.D.N.Y Aug. 13, 1997). In
this case, the bank refused to take mortgage loan applications from areas in Connecticut
and NewYork with significant minority populations and failed to explain the elimination
of these areas from its lending areas. The case was resolved with consent decree. For the
case summary see http://xvwxv.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/casesummary.htm (last
visited Nov. 11, 2005).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. (E.D. Wis. July 17, 1995). In this
case, race was used by the defendants as a factor in determining whether to issue home-
owner insurance policies in the Milwaukee metropolitan area. It was resolved in a consent
decree according to which over 1,600 households received damages. For the case sum-
mary see http://wwv.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/casesumaniary.htm (last visited
Nov. 11,2005).
11. Williams v. Staples, Inc., 372 F3d 662,665 (4th Cir. 2004).
12. See id. at 666; see also Holland & Knight, Community Services Team-Pro
Bono, Major Case Details, http://www.hklaw.com/CST/MajorCases/CaseDetail.asp?ID=
120 (last visited Nov. 11, 2005) (noting that after the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision
of the district court, which had granted summary judgment in favor of Staples, the case
was settled for $50,000).
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accumulated, fundamental exclusion from the marketplace that is tremen-
dously significant and disparaging on economic, social and emotional levels.
The legal challenge is, of course, to find how law can better help in resisting
the impulse to discriminate, the impulse that here manifests itself through
contracts.' 3 For years the responsibility for this challenge has been assigned
to constitutional law and the antidiscrimination laws that were enacted to
fulfill those egalitarian ideals that the constitution was seeking to protect.
If asked, the typical contracts scholar would probably say that dealing with
the phenomenon of contractual discrimination is not a matter for con-
tract law-that it lies outside the realm of contract doctrine.
This Article attempts to bridge the huge gap between discrirnina-
tion and contracts. While pressing classical legal boundaries, it seeks to
break a long tradition of mutual exclusivity between the two arms of law:
the one that is supposed to fight discrimination and the one that is ex-
pected to support transactions. Within this framework the Article focuses
on situations in which people are deprived of their constitutional right to
make a contract,14 i.e. when the discrimination materializes at the precon-
tractual stage, as a refusal to even enter into a contractual relationship with
people who are labeled as belonging to certain long-deprived groups.
Such refusal sabotages these people's basic access to the marketplace and
their ability to participate in its activity. This severe problem, it is hereby
maintained, should be addressed by contractual tools that are constitution-
ally sensitive.
Up until now, the possibility of addressing discrimination with con-
tractual tools has remained largely unexplored. Even the very few who
have considered this option have fallen short in illustrating how it can
prove fruitful." This Article emphasizes the importance of such a contrac-
tual alternative and seeks to demonstrate not only that the use of
contractual tools is a promising step to take, but also that it is a powerful
13. The argument is not that the law is the only or even the best way to defeat
discrimination. For skepticism regarding the ability of law to create social change in gen-
eral, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991). For a similar approach in the context of racial discrimination and legal
achievements such as Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), see MICHAEL J.
KLARmAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS:THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
RACIAL EQUALITY (2004) and David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin,Judicial Power and Civil
Rights Reconsidered, 114 YALE L.J. 591 (2004) (reviewing Klarman's book and analyzing
critically the above skepticism). Rather, the notion is that as much as law is able to have
influence it should be utilized to do so in the most effective way.
14. The constitutional right to make contracts is established through reading the 13th
Amendment's general promise to abolish slavery, including all badges and incidents of
slavery, together with 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the federal law that was enacted to implement this
promise in the market. For an elaborated discussion of the legislation and the relevant case
law see infra Parts I.A., I.B.
15. See infra Part IL.D and note 161.
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and attainable step that can be well-integrated into current theory, includ-
ing economic analysis, of contract law.
In order to find a path for such an effective integration, the Article
first exposes the dramatic and harmful detachment between contract doc-
trine and the scattered norms of antidiscrimination. It then creates an
original meeting point between the two bodies of law. This meeting point
is intentionally located within contract doctrine and it is suggested that in
order to find it we need to go back to the fundamental and powerful
concept of"freedom of contract" and dismantle it.The key is defining and
establishing the freedom to make a contract, an essential stage in recon-
structing an alternative discourse that is neither "public" nor "private"
and, at the same time, which engages in both "public" and "private" con-
cerns. Along the way a special effort is made to use one shared language
which is based on contractual logic rather than on critical theories that
share a more direct and absolute belief in the supremacy of the value of
equality. This is indeed an "effort" for anyone who believes in the ideal of
egalitarian society, but it is an effort worth making if one is interested in
achieving more than what has been achieved under the current legal re-
gime. As part of this effort, the Article espouses the liberal and individual
standpoint that underlies contract doctrine and even builds on a new the-
ory that was originally developed by the law and economics school of
thought with little attention to equality.
Two clarifications regarding the scope of the project seem in place:
the earlier goes to the precontractual focus and the later has to do with
the emphasis on race. The Article is limited to the pre-contractual phase
for three main reasons: First, from the victims' perspective, their exclusion
from participating in the contractual game reaches its peak when a con-
tract is denied and they are blocked from access to the marketplace.
Second, the contract doctrine's reluctance to address the problem of dis-
crimination is particularly evident when the discriminating behavior takes
place before a contract is reached-the absence of a contract reinforces
the general tendency to treat the issue as not having a contractual nature.
Finally, and as result of the previous point, until now there has not been
much, if any, focus on the special questions that arise with respect to the
precontractual phase, whereas the need for contractual treatment of dis-
crimination during the lifetime of the contract and upon its termination
has already been discussed in several works. 16 Within this limited scope,
the Article will offer analysis that is relevant to discrimination on different
grounds, such as gender, age, sexual identity, religion, disability, familial
status, and so on.17 However, during the research process it became clear
16. See infra Part IL.D and note 161.
17. Although this list could be very long, it should still be limited to groups whose
members face difficulties that they cannot escape and who pay a price for being different
from the imaginary "normal" person. For instance, the analysis in this Article does not cover
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that race-based discrimination, mainly against African American people,
presents an especially persistent problem, unique in its frequency, range
and depth.While this entailed a focus on the refusal to contract with Afri-
can Americans, particularly in the examples that are given, the Article's
core analysis is entirely applicable to other grounds for discrimination.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I reviews the legal treatment
of the problem of discriminatory refusals to contract under constitutional
law and antidiscrimination statutes. It opens with the Thirteenth Amend-
ment as the norm that should be read as a promise that all citizens will
have the freedom to "buy and sell when they please" and that "a dollar in
the hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands
of a white man." 8 It then proceeds to the legislative attempts to satisfy
this constitutional promise: the hybrid patchwork of antidiscrimination
laws that are targeted at different kinds of contracts. The account is lim-
ited to the canvassing of the main statutes that have contractual bearings
and does not attempt to offer a nuanced description of the many laws that
govern discrimination. Rather, it seeks to emphasize the contractual na-
ture of the reality that is covered under these laws.
The discussion of the current contract doctrine is at the core of Part
II. It exposes a remarkable lack of contractual legal analysis of the issue-
indeed, the most common manner in which contract doctrine deals with
the problem of discrimination is by not dealing with it at all. An attempt
is made in this section to listen to "the sound of silence" and to capture
the various forms of evasive contractual responses-ranging from com-
plete disregard of the issue through some degree of marginalization, to
harsh resistance to any form of anti-discriminatory regulation. With very
few exceptions, contract doctrine refuses to let contractual discrimination
in, even though the typical situations are completely contractual in nature
and beg a contractual response.
If the first two parts portray the facade of a schizophrenic legal ap-
proach, then Part III presents an effort to look beyond it to the basic
structure upon which it stands. Although the protection of equality under
constitutional and antidiscrimination norms has contractual origins and
vast contractual content, somehow the law divides the undividable. This
separation of locus is accompanied by a series of dichotomies: contract
law is "private" while discrimination is "public"; the former is focused on
economy whereas the latter is of a social nature; the realm of contracts is
dominated by Whites while discrimination controls the lives of Blacks.
The argument made in this part is that this cumulative structure of oppo-
sites creates a multilayered segregation between the marketplace and the
reality of inequality. This yields two discourses that are so distanced and
refusal to contract with people who behave rudely or suffer from financial problems in
ways that deter their potential partner.
18. See Jones v.Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,443 (1968).
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alien that the chances for fruitful communication and improvement are
severely diminished.
The shift from defining the problem to seeking its solution begins in
Part IV of the Article. Resisting the traditional adversarial structure, this
section is based upon a reconstructive effort.The new approach tried here
is to include the discriminators' liberties and their victims' rights in one
unified discourse and to consider their freedoms simultaneously by using
contractual language and logic. The process starts with an analysis of the
major harms caused by the segregated discourses. It is maintained that the
greatest hazard is the worsening of the problem of discrimination, mainly
through escalation of the resentment and antagonism between those indi-
viduals traditionally analyzed under contract law and those traditionally
considered under the antidiscrimination norms.What follows is a contrac-
tual model that seeks integration. The model is founded on a dismantling
of the clich& of "freedom OF contract," which is critiqued as being too
narrow and far too excluding, and replacing it with an acknowledgment
of a myriad of freedoms. The main innovation here is the emphasis on the
freedom TO contract-the basic ability to make contracts and to freely
participate in the contractual world. This is an aspect of the contractual
freedoms that by and large have remained invisible within contract doc-
trine, since it has been taken for granted by those who always enjoyed it.
The translation of the requirement of equality into contractual language
facilitates a nuanced balancing between equality, now conceptualized as a
type of contractual freedom, and the traditional argument of freedom OF
contract. Once the freedoms are discussed in tandem, with special atten-
tion to the actual scope and meaning of each, it becomes harder to dismiss
the claim for participation in the market-the claim that under the cur-
rent regime does not even have a contractual name.
Part V implements this theoretical model of freedoms by suggesting
a path to the establishment and reinforcement of the freedom TO con-
tract within contract doctrine. What is proposed is to adopt the more
generous versions of the contractual duty of good faith. That is, those ver-
sions that extrapolate the duty from the contractual period to the pre-
contractual phase will be discussed, and within this framework, discrimi-
nation will be identified as illegitimate business behavior, as an overt
expression of bad faith.
In a methodology that fits the Article's substance, the second portion
of part V then crosses yet another boundary, this time the boundary be-
tween legal schools of thought by adding "law and economics" reasoning
to the initial "law and society" suggestion to categorize precontractual
discrimination as negotiation in bad faith. The new "no-retraction" prin-
ciple, recently developed by Prof. Omri Ben-Shahar,' 9 is applied here to
19. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Contracts without Consent: Exploring a New Basis for Con-
tractual Liability, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1829 (2004).
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the discriminatory realm and offers a further justification of the imposi-
tion of precontractual liability on discriminators who choose to withdraw
from negotiations due to their discriminatory "tastes." Interestingly, the
supportive effect seems mutual: the "no-retraction" model empowers the
freedom TO contract while its application to situations of precontractual
discrimination appears to strengthen the validity and efficacy of the no-
retraction principle itself
Following the last point of mutual contribution, the Article con-
cludes with a dual call, made from both the perspective of those who
believe in the burning need to defeat discrimination and from the per-
spective of those who are concerned more generally with maintaining the
centrality of contract doctrine within the legal system. The latter of the
two argues that contract doctrine has an important role to play within our
jurisprudence: it serves as an essential and unique arena within which the
struggle for freedom, the freedom to make contracts, may have a better
chance to prove successful. Incorporating the demand of contractual free-
dom in the contractual discourse is not only very natural but also
tremendously beneficial, and urgent. As both of the above calls illustrate,
the Article replies in the affirmative to the question raised by its title-
contract law has something constitutional to say, and clear insistence on
the freedom to contract is a crucial component of an equal society.
I.THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROMISE OF EQUAL CONTRACTING
AND ITS STATUTORY IMPLEMENTATION
While classical contract doctrine to a large extent ignores questions
of discrimination in general, and especially the question of refusal to con-
tract, both constitutional law and the civil rights legal arena contain many
scattered statutes that are all aimed at dealing with this problem. Some
scholars have been using the term "Antidiscrimination Law" to describe
the body of statutes that deals with inequalities.20 Even though this termi-
nology is very useful and shall be used here, it is worth noticing its
delusional potential, for in fact "Antidiscrimination Law" is more of a
patchwork-a significant disadvantage when it comes to practical en-
forcement.
Looking at these antidiscrimination norms through the narrow
prism of contracts turns out to be a perplexing experience. Some of these
statutes are focused on contracts in general, whereas others are dedicated
to particular types of contracts such as housing or employment. Some of
these norms were based on standards as high as the constitutional level,
while others were formed as federal laws or even State-made laws. Many
20. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE
AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001); ROBERT C. POST, PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE
LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW (2001).
[VOL. 11:133
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of them cover a specific discriminated group, such as people of color,21 the
elderly,22 or the disabled, 2
3 whereas others are more general in nature.
Since the main concern here is contractual, i.e. the attitude of the contractual
doctrine toward the issue of discrimination, I will limit myself to a rough
sketch of the more relevant parts of this legal clutter. My main purpose is
not the discussion of these norms in and of themselves, but rather to sug-
gest the strong historical and substantive connection of these norms to
the world of contracts. The starting point would be drafting the constitu-
tional framework.
A. The Thirteenth Amendment
The Thirteenth Amendment is most known for the promise of up-
rooting the institution of slavery. It provides:
"Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by.- ,,25
appropriate legislation.
The Thirteenth Amendment deserves present-day attention even
though slavery is long gone. In the last few decades it has been interpreted
in a broad manner as guaranteeing liberty, universal freedom and equal
21. Civil Rights Act of 1866 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981, § 1982 (2000)).
22. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202,
81 Star. 603 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000)).
23. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 (codified at 42
U.S.C. %§ 12101-2213 (2000)). For a recent analysis of the scope of this Act see, for exam-
ple, Nancy J. King, Website Access for Customers with Disabilities: Can We Get Therefrom Here?,
2003 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 6 (2003) and Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law,
114 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2004) ("[Wihile the ADA's achievements must be celebrated, the stat-
ute's limitations have become increasingly apparent.").
24. See, for example, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2 (2000), which states, in the employment
context:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
25. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII.
26. See generally Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights & the Thir-
teenth Amendment, 45 B.C. L. REv. 307 (2004) (exploring the historical and contextual
background of the Thirteenth Amendment and the changing approaches to its scope).
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citizenry to all human beings. According to such reading, the Amendment
encompasses a deeper and more substantive protection of "the right of
individuals to make and pursue meaningful life decisions. 27 The connec-
tion to slavery is maintained by viewing any limitation of the protected
liberties, freedoms or rights as a potential "badge of slavery' 28 Much of
the above expansive comprehension of the Thirteenth Amendment is
based on its historical background. It is connected to the intentions of
Congressmen and legislators, who meant to achieve more than a formal
ending of slavery and shared a dream of an integrated egalitarian society.2 9
Although it is often shadowed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Thirteenth Amendment has greater relevancy to market activity and to
the protection of the equal right to contract.30 According to the current
judicial approach, the Fourteenth Amendment is State-based and cannot
help when it comes to private discriminators, while the Thirteenth
Amendment was released from a similar restrictive reading back in 1968. 3'
This distinction makes the Thirteenth Amendment a suitable site for crea-
tive antidiscrimination activism, mainly by way of adding to the civil
rights legislation based on the mandate given to Congress under the sec-
ond section of the Amendment.
For the contractual focus of the current analysis it is essential to re-
call that despite the vast potential of the Thirteenth Amendment to cover
the discriminatory denial of contracts, the ability of a private person to
27. Id. at 361.
28. Shortly after passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court held in The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883), that the Amendment empowered Congress not only to
end physical slavery but also to "pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges
and incidents of slavery." Since then, the expression "badge of slavery" has been used to
encompass policies, events and acts that reflect the hngering effects of slavery.
29. The Thirty-ninth Congress was committed to securing
'practical freedom' for the Freedmen. The historical materials show that
Congress' attention was not focused entirely on the official acts of truculent
Southern judges, legislators, and other public officials. Nor was Congress
concerned only with statutes that discriminated in explicit terms against the
Freedmen. On the contrary, Congress was well aware of the role played by
private discrimination in the South's recalcitrant refusal to accept the neces-
sary consequences of the Civil War, and it intended to provide a remedy for
such discrimination. Furthermore, since it was acting pursuant to the Thir-
teenth Amendment, Congress was not doctrinally obligated to parse the
public and private qualties of the obstacles which [W]hite Southerners were
bent on interposing in the path of Congress' legislative goals.
Barry Sullivan, Reconstructing Reconstruction: Historical Reconstruction, Reconstruction History,
and the Proper Scope of Section 1981, 98 YALE LJ. 541, 564 (1988).
30. Tobias B. Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the Global Economy, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1007 (2002) (maintaining that in the absence of a state action re-
quirement, the Thirteenth Amendment has a significant bearing on "private social and
economic relationships").
31. See infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
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bring a cause of action that is based directly and independently on the
Amendment has not been established. 2 Such direct use of the first section
of the Amendment is especially important when the discriminatory be-
havior is not covered by an antidiscrimination law that was enacted under
its second section.The question then arises as to whether contract law can
offer itself as a platform through which the constitutional ideas that origi-
nated in the Thirteenth Amendment can be enforced. This question will
stand at the core of the discussion in the last two parts of this piece. In the
meantime, what follows is a closer look at central antidiscrimination laws
that are strongly tied both to contracts and to the Thirteenth Amendment
and its background.
B. Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 US.C. 5 1981 and 5 1982)
When focusing on contracts, the most powerful and direct statement
regarding discrimination is to be found in 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which pro-
hibits racial discrimination in the contracting process. In its relevant part,
the section maintains: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
"3enforce contracts.
To complete the contractual idea, and to close the circle of com-
mercial activity, section 1982 follows, and establishes the equal right to
own property. Section 1982 provides: "All citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by
white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property.
' 34
Originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, this pair
of sections was intended to implement the promise of the Thirteenth
32. See, e.g., Tsesis, supra note 26, at 344-49.
33. Section 1981 was amended in 1991 to read as follows:
(a) All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by [W]hite
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, li-
censes, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
(b) For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce contracts" in-
cludes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts,
and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the
contractual relationship.
(c) The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000).
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Amendment by translating the Amendment's declaration into "market
language" and concentrating on practical economic matters.
Interestingly to the present focus, there were long years in which the
courts, following the landmark 1896 decision of Plessy,3 read neither the
Thirteenth Amendment nor sections 1981 and 1982 as creating a positive
right on the part of Blacks to make contracts and to actively participate in
the market on an equal basis with Whites. The Plessy Court empha-
sized:" 'It would be running the slavery argument into the ground,' ... 'to
make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to
make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will ... deal
with in other matters of intercourse or business.' ,
36
This refusal to acknowledge a meaningful and pragmatic positive
right to make contracts rendered practically ineffective both the Thir-
teenth Amendment and the accompanying portion of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 now codified as sections 1981 and 1982. If White people,
with whom political, economic and social power resided, were free to
discriminate as they saw fit, then the guarantee of equal rights to contract
was nothing more than a mere puff. Narrowing the rights to make con-
tracts and own property to rights that are protected only against State
action offered the freedmen little or no help: for the most part they
needed shelter, food, employment, clothing and so on-things they could,
or could not, negotiate and buy in the private market, with no engage-
ment whatsoever with the official State.
For our purposes it is important to realize the long-lasting legiti-
macy of the discriminatory refusal to contract. When Barbara and Joseph
Jones sought to purchase a home in Missouri they were rejected by the
owner, Alfred H. Mayer Co., who openly declared in court a general pol-
icy not to sell to Negroes. The year was 1966 and the District Court in
Missouri held that the "defendants did no more than politely refuse to
enter into a contract of sale with plaintiffs;"3 8 and added that the Jones'
have no "rights to compel an unwilling seller to convey his property to
them in the absence of a statute so requiring.'' 9
Only in 1968, after years of bitter civil rights battles, did the
Supreme Court reverse this holding and decide, in the celebrated Jones v.
35. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1895).
36. Id. at 543 (quotingThe Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,24-25 (1883)).
37. See, e.g., Joseph W Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodation and Private
Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1283, 1431 (1996) ("Prior to Jones v. Mayer, ... sections 1981
and 1982 were thought to apply only to 'state action ... "" (quoting Cornelius v. Benevo-
lent Protective Order of the Elks, 382 F Supp. 1182,1201 (D. Conn. 1974)).
38. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 255 F Supp. 115, 129 (E.D. Mo. 1966). See Flor-
ence W. Roisman, The Impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on Racially Discriminatory
Donative Transfers, 53 ALA. L. REv. 463, 477-80 (2002), for a more elaborate discussion.
39. Jones, 255 F Supp. at 130.
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Mayer case," to extend the protection of sections 1981 and 1982 beyond
state actions, bringing to life the spirit of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Following the revolutionary Jones decision, the courts struck down private
discrimination in many contract matters, and most pertinently for our
purposes, expounded that sections 1981 and 1982 also proscribe discrimi-
natory refusals to enter into a contract.42 For a while the courts advanced
the battle for equality in the broad manner in which they continued to
construe sections 1981 and 1982. Later, when the courts appeared more
restrictive and limited the scope of these sections, Congress intervened by
legislating the 1991 Civil Rights Act.43 As of today, sections 1981 and
1982 are taken as the most direct legal treatment of the problem of con-
tractual discrimination.Yet, as stated earlier, these sections are not the only
statutes that have a bearing on the question of contractual discrimination
at hand.
C. Additional Civil Rights Legislation
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000)
Title 11 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion or national origin and therefore covers a
wider range of possible grounds for refusal to contract than sections 1981
and 1982 discussed above. On the other hand, Title II is limited to places
of "public accommodation, as defined in this section" and in that sense is
narrower than sections 1981 and 1982, which apply to any discriminator
regardless of business structure or location. Contrary to some popular be-
liefs, Title II does not prohibit discrimination in any place open to the
public-barbershops and beauty parlors, for instance, are not included in
its scope.44 More generally, and more significantly, it seems that under Title
40. Jones, 392 U.S. 409.
41. For a landmark decision applying section 1981 to a contract with a private
school, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
42. See Katrina Grider, Hair Salons and Racial Stereotypes, 12 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 75,
99 (1989).
43. Civil Rights Act of 1991 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 5 1981 (2000)). In
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989), the Supreme Court held
that section 1981 is inapplicable "to conduct which occurs after the formation of a con-
tract and which does not interfere with the right to enforce established contract
obligations." Following this decision, the 1991 Civil Rights Act denoted as section 1981(a)
what had been section 1981, and added new section 1981(b), which defined the term
"make and enforce contracts" as including "the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and condi-
tions of the contractual relationship." 42 U.S.C. 5 1981 (2000).
44. See Grider, supra note 42, at 89. But see 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1)-(4) (2000) (cov-
ering barber shops which are located within the physical premises of a place of "public
accommodation," such as a hotel or motel).
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II, retail stores are not restricted in their right to exclude potential buyers
on discriminatory grounds, and the victims of those stores need to satisfy
the conditions of sections 1981 and 1982 in order to obtain relief.4 Addi-
tionally, Title II does not apply to places that are not open to the public at
all, such as private homes. As a result, it does not ban a discriminatory re-
fusal to rent a room or a residential unit in the owner's home.46
In general, the connection of this antidiscrimination statute to the
refusal to contract is made through the contractual nature of the right to
enter places of public accommodation as well as the right to fully and
equally enjoy the services rendered upon admittance to those places. In a
sense, the picture in which a Black person is left standing outside the
locked door of a clothing store while White people are shopping freely
inside captures neatly the deepness of the rejection entailed in the dis-
47criminatory refusal to contract.
2. Civil Rights Act of 1968-Fair Housing Act
The housing sub-market is covered by a special antidiscrimination
legislation. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, commonly called
the Fair Housing Act (FHA), prohibits discrimination in the sale, rental or
4 49negotiation of housing.48 The FHA originated from racial concerns,
mainly the need to respond to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. and to the publication of the Kerner Commission Report with
its apocalyptic statement that the country was "moving toward two socie-
ties, one [B]lack, one white--separate and unequal."'  Despite this
background, the FHA's antidiscrimination command now applies to
broader foundations of discrimination and is not limited to racial
grounds.5' In this regard the FHA is similar to Title II and far more inclu-
sive than Sections 1981 and 1982.
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1)-(4), for the definition of "public accommodation"
under Title II. In general, the definition is much narrower than that of the same term un-
der the ADA-it primarily covers hotels, restaurants, theatres and stadiums.
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) (excluding a "building which contains not more
than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such
establishment as his residence"); see also infra Part I.D (discussing the background of the 42
U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) "Mrs. Murphy's exemption").
47. See PATRICIA J.WILLIAMs, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS, 44-51 (1991).
48. See 42 U.S.C. 5 3601 (2000). See generally 15 Am. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 380
(2000).
49. Robert G. Schwenm & Michael Allen, For the Rest of Their Lives: Seniors and the
Fair Housing Act, 90 IowA L. REV. 121, 143 (2004).
50. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY
COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968).
51. Three additional bases of prohibited discrimination are now part of the FHA.
See Pub. L. No. 93-383, 808, 88 Stat. 633, 728 (1974) ("sex" was added by a 1974 amend-
ment); Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) ("familial status" and "handicap" were
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Most relevant to the focus of the current discussion is § 3604(a),
which holds it unlawful: "[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a
bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or oth-
erwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
'"5 2
The contractual aspect of the FHA is quite clear: both buying and
renting a place of residence are transactions that are completed by con-
tracts. Indeed, for many they represent a prototype of the commercial
contract. However, it is important to emphasize that numerous contracts
for the sale or rent of real estate properties are not subject to the FHA.s3
The best known exemption from the prohibition of discrimination is the
one named after the imaginary Mrs. Murphy.s4 Since this exemption lim-
its the prohibition of discrimination under both Title II and the FHA, and
sheds light on the controversy around the discriminatory refusal to con-
tract, a more careful investigation of it follows.
D. Mrs. Murphy's Exemption
The origins of the Mrs. Murphy exemption are to be found in the
early 1960s when legislators and laypeople argued about the justification
added by the 1988 Fair Housing Amendments Act); Schwemm & Allen, supra note 49, at
145 (discrimination on the basis of age).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2000). See also 42 U.S.C. § 3604(0 (2000) (adding compa-
rable bans with regard to discrimination of handicaps).
53. See 15 AM.JuR. 2D Civil Rights 5 381 (2000):
In general, the Fair Housing Act applies to all dwellings. However, although
single-family houses sold or rented by the owner are generally covered by
the Act, an exemption does exist for such houses sold or rented without the
use of the facilities or services of a real-estate agent and without publication
of an advertisement violative of 42 U.S.C.A. 5 3604(c), as long as the private
individual does not own more than three such houses at one time and ap-
plies this exemption to only one sale in any 24 month period, if the seller
was not the most recent resident of the house. In addition, a religious organi-
zation, association or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization
operated by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or
society, may limit the sale, rental or occupancy of dwellings which it owns or
operates for other than a commercial purpose to persons of the same relig-
ion, or give preference to such persons, unless membership in the religion is
restricted on account of race, color, or national origin. Private clubs that are
not open to the public, which as an incident to its primary purpose or pur-
poses provides lodgings which it owns or operates for other than a
commercial purpose, also may limit the rental or occupancy of such lodgings
to its members, or may give preference to its members. Finally, nothing in
the Fair Housing Act limits the applicability of any reasonable laws regarding
the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling. The
familial status rules of the Act do not apply to housing for older persons.
54. See infra Part I.D.
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and scope of what later became Title II-the outlawing of discrimination
in places of "public accommodation.5 5 Back then Mrs. Murphy served as
a representation of the "victim of the victims": a poor widow who barely
makes a living by renting rooms in her modest home and who would
collapse, either financially or morally, were she compelled by intrusive
laws to make the cruel choice between losing her source of income and
living with tenants she finds objectionable. "In the political conservative
account, she was the everywoman whose dignity and freedom the state
should not deny by saddling her with tenants whom she would not
choose as friends.' 6 The image of Mrs. Murphy as a victim of antidis-
crimination rules that interfere in the private market was so powerful that
it led to the exclusion of small dwellings from the definition of "public
accommodation. 's Several years later, in 1968, an analogous exemption
was added on behalf of the same Mrs. Murphy to the banning of dis-
crimination in the "fair-housing" context.58
Although thinking about a particular, albeit theoretical, woman may
help in problematizing the issue at hand, several scholars pointed to the
racist aspects of the very use of a "Mrs. Murphy.'' 9 The vulnerable persona
attached to Mrs. Murphy distracts us from asking why does she find some
potential tenants to be so objectionable? Why would having them around
(allegedly) be so devastating an experience that it might drive her to give
up her income? The criticism can become clearer by replacing Mrs. Mur-
phy with an alternative and perhaps more typical landowner. Consider, for
instance, Mr. Archie Bunker, a cheap retired man who rents his place
coldheartedly to whomever is willing to pay him more but who also
strongly detests African Americans .6 It is doubtful that such an "Archie
55. Republican Senator George D.Aiken ofVermont apparently conceived the term
"Mrs. Murphy" while suggesting that while prohibiting discrimination Congress "inte-
grate the Waldorf and other large hotels, but permit the 'Mrs. Murphys,' who run small
rooming houses all over the country, to rent their rooms to those they choose." See
ROBERT D. LOEVY, To END ALL SEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF THE PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 51 (1990).
56. Marie A. Failinger, Remembering Mrs. Murphy: A Remedies Approach to the Conflict
Between Gay/Lesbian Renters and Religious Landlords, 29 CAP. U. L. REv. 383,383 (2001).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) (exempting boardinghouses containing five or fewer
rooms for rent if the owner resides in the house).
58. See, e.g., James D. Walsh, Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call for Repeal of the Mrs. Mur-
phy Exemption to the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 605, 608 (1999) (noting
that while the inclusion of the exemption in Title II was pursuant to much debate, the
reproduction of the exemption in the housing context was less discussed).
59. See, e.g., Sam Stonefield, Non-Determinative Discrimination, Mixed Motives, and the
Inner Boundary of Discrimination Law, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 85, 101 (1986) ("Within the area
specified by the exemption, 'Mrs. Murphy' can express herself by indulging her racist
tastes, if any, and societal support for her freedom to discriminate trumps the conflicting
personal and societal interests in prohibiting discrimination.").
60. Archie Bunker was a fictional character in the long-running and top-rated
American television sitcom All in the Family, which premiered in January of 1971. He was
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image" could have convinced ambivalent people to support the restriction
of civil rights by norms of freedom of contract.
E. Summary: Efforts and Hurdles
Legal awareness of problems of discrimination in the market has
reached unprecedented levels during the last half century. The law has
moved from unawareness to a burst of new legislation accompanied by
novel judicial decisions that gave effect to older ineffective legislation. The
legal system both followed and led society, in a quest for more equality.
Although much can be debated with regard to the practical results of this
trend and the hurdles in defending equality, such a debate goes beyond
the present contractual focus.
In brief and rough sketches, however, it is worth mentioning that
the levels of proof that the victims must meet, mainly the requirement to
prove the discriminatory intention of the defendant, present a primary dif-
ficulty while illustrating how antidiscrimination laws tend to reflect "the
perpetrator perspective.",6' Additionally, the complicated legislative struc-
62
ture is not only confusing, it also leaves uncovered spaces. A lacuna
which is particularly interesting for our purposes, and which can later add
practical justification to this Article's proposition, appears during the con-
tractual negotiations in the retail market. On top of the fact that stores are
usually not covered under Title 11,63 a myopic definition has been given
under section 1981 to the process of "making a contract," according to
which the entire shopping experience is narrowed down to the sudden
641fomoment of exchange. As a result, for example, if racial harassment by
a reactionary, bigoted blue-collar worker, and devoted family man, played to acclaim by
Carroll O'Connor. All in the Family got many of its laughs by playing on Archie's bigotry,
although the dynamic tension between Archie and his liberal son-in-law, Michael
"Meathead" Stivic, played by actor Rob Reiner, provided an ongoing political and social
sounding board for a variety of topics.
61. See, e.g., Matt Graves, Purchasing Mhile Black: How Courts Condone Discrimination
in the Marketplace, 7 MIcH. J. RACE & L. 159, 160-61 (2001) (maintaining that "[t]hrough
heightened pleading requirements, courts have made it nearly impossible to seek remedy
under the very federal civil rights laws that are supposed to guard against discrimination in
the marketplace"); see also Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049
(1978); Charles R. Lawrence Ill, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STsA. L. REv. 317 (1987).
62. See, e.g., AYiss, supra note 20, at 3 (stating that "[t]he civil rights laws of the
1960s focused on only a handful of nonretail markets--chiefly concerning employment,
housing, and public accommodation services. Indeed, the most gaping hole in our civil
rights law concerns retail gender discrimination.").
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1)-(4).
64. See, e.g., Amanda G. Main, Racial Profiling in Places of Public Accommodation: Theo-
ries of Recovery and Relief 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 289, 307 (describing "the narrow window for a
viable claim" under § 1981).
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security guards had occurred in the store and deterred the victims from
making a transaction, no remedy is available. 65 The problems become even
more severe when combined with procedural barriers such as require-
ments to exhaust administrative remedies before suing and the need to
bring an action within a shortened limitations period.66 And if this is not
enough, then many times victims must face judges and jurors who find
their stories unbelievable or a product of paranoia and tend to accept too
easily poor excuses which are made by the discriminators in order to
conceal the discrimination.67
However, even though the antidiscrimination legislation is taxing
and equality is still far from accomplished, there can be no doubt as to the
intensity of the effort that has been made and the high priority that has
been given to the issue of discrimination. And yet, as I will immediately
attempt to illustrate, this has not even remotely been the case as far as
contract doctrine is concerned.
II.THE SOUND OF SILENCE: How CONTRACT
DOCTRINE TREATS THE PROBLEM
Private law scholars and contract law theorists rarely enter the civil
rights arena discussed above, and seldom participate in the constitutional
discourse regarding persistent inequalities in our society.The exposition of
this neglect and the ways it manifests itself, as well as a documentation of
the few rare exceptions, is undertaken in the following four sections.
A. Ignoring the Problem Altogether
The most common way in which contract doctrine deals with the
problem of discrimination is by not dealing with it at all. When Judge
Posner faced a contractual claim raised by an African American who tried
65. See, e.g., Morris v. Office Max Inc., available at http://www.lexis.com/
research/retrieve? m=76ee7a2b31de63ce788d3ad03654c093&csvc=le& cform=byCitation&
fmtstr=FULL&docnum=l&_startdoc=l&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAA&_md5= ff8d662378e029
43ba353874b346dad2-n167, 89 F3d 411 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a plaintiff's § 1981
claim asserting that a merchant interfered with his prospective contractual relations).
66. For example, victims of discrimination covered by Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 may submit a complaint with the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice or file a civil action in federal court. See U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights
Division-Housing and Civil Enforcement Section, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/
housing/faq.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2005). However, if there is a state law prohibiting
such discrimination, state remedies must be exhausted before bringing suit in federal
court.
67. See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Causation in Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent Ver-
sus Impact, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1469 (illustrating how the same cognitive biases that give rise
to discrimination in the society can also distort causal judgments about that discrimina-
tion).
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to argue that his employment contract included an obligation of equal
treatment, his response was chilling:
If what McKnight is trying to argue is that public policy reads
into every such contract a contractual duty not to discriminate on
racial grounds, this would imply that every victim of racial dis-
crimination in employment has a claim for breach of contract as
well as a claim under the statutes forbidding such discrimina-
tion. That would be extravagant .... 68
Evidently the idea that someone might have a contractual right not to
be discriminated against took Judge Posner by surprise and he was not
willing to give it a try. If this quote were taken as representative, one
could conclude that the issue of discrimination has nothing to do with
contractual standards. Is it possible to find a more explicit unwillingness to
admit the contractual nature of the problem of discrimination?
As a matter of method, describing emptiness, silence or omission
within a theory is a very difficult task.69 The first step might naturally be
at the legislative level and indeed after exploring Article II of the Uni-
form Commercial Code it becomes clear that the entire issue of
discrimination is absent from its text.° A search for reference to discrimi-
nation in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts again yields zero results.
71
Trying to further document the sound of silence, albeit somewhat
arbitrarily, I undertook a simple experiment based on what law students
learn about the law of contracts. I examined fourteen popular contracts
casebooks, on the assumption that they wield an early and particularly
powerful influence on the contractual understanding of generations of
68. McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 E2d 104, 112 (7th Cir. 1990).
69. The problem is especially severe regarding the American law of contracts due to
two main characteristics: (a) the absence of a legislated code of contracts, as opposed to
many legal systems that are civil by origin or influenced by civil systems; and (b) the pres-
ence of a federal system of law that includes states' authority to legislate and which, in
turn, makes it less precise to talk about a single contract doctrine.Without derogating from
these difficulties, the fact that scholars do explore some sort of general American law of
contracts and routinely write about the theories that shape it, ratifies the attempt to do so
by looking at secondary sources.
70. See U.C.C. §5 2-101 to -804 (2005).While explicitly regulating only the sale of
goods, Article II of the U.C.C. has always had a strong influence on the common law of
contracts.When compared to "classical" contract law it is considered to be more "holistic"
in its approach and it incorporates community norms much more directly.
71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1979).This highly influential source
by the prestigious American Law Institute might be taken not only as a set of descriptions
and refinements of the contractual common law-a reduction of judicial decisions to
rule-like form-but also as an attempt to explain all of current contract doctrine accom-
panied by some efforts to reform it.
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lawyers and scholars.72 With the help of these books' detailed indices I
researched how they covered the issue of discrimination in the contrac-
tual context. Remarkably, only one of the books had a primary entry for
the term "discrimination." Again, it is difficult to measure the intensity
of silence, but to appreciate the lack of any entry for such a significant
term one should consider the fact that all these books have an extremely
detailed index with a rich variety of entries that go far beyond the tradi-
tional contractual vocabulary, including contemporary terms such as
"surrogate parenting", "internet", "poems" and so on.The vast majority of
the books-eleven out of the fourteen, including casebooks generally
known to be quite sensitive to social concerns74 -choose to remain totally
silent.
In an attempt to prove the general rule of unawareness through its
exception, it is important to note that the only book that indexed the
expressions of "Racial Discrimination" and "Gender Discrimination" as
72. See BRIAN A. BLUM & AMY C. BusHAw, CONTRACTS: CASES, DISCUSSION, AND
PROBLEMS (Erwin Chemerinsky ed., Aspen Publishers 2003) (1958); JOHN D. CALAMAEI,
JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN H. BENDER, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS (Jesse H.
Choper ed., West Group 2000) (1978); JOHN P. DAWSON, WILLIAM BURNETT HARVEY &
STANLEY D. HENDERSON, CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT (Robert C. Clark ed.,
Foundation Press 2003) (1959); DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LAWRENCE
PONOROFF, MAKING AND DOING DEALS: CONTRACTS IN CONTEXT (LexisNexis 2002)
(1993); LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW (Jesse H.
Choper ed.,West Group 2001) (1946); E. ALLAN FARNSWOETH,WILLIAM FYOUNG & CAROL
SANGER, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (Robert C. Clark ed., Foundation Press 2001)
(1965); AMY HILSMAN KASTELY, DEBORAH WAIRE POST & SHARON KANG HoM,
CONTRACTING LAW (Carolina Academic Press 1996) (1950); CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN
M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(Erwin Chemerinsky ed., Aspen Publishers 2003) (1953); STEWART MACAULAY, JOHN
KIDWELL & WILLIAM WHITFORD, CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION (LexisNexis 2003) (1931);
WILLIAM McGovERN, LARY LAWRENCE & BRYAN D. HULL, CONTRACTS AND SALES:
CONTEMPORARY CASES AND PROBLEMS (LexisNexis 2002) (1934); EDWARD J. MURPHY,
RICHAR E. SPEIDEL & IAN ARVEs, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW (Robert C. Clark ed.,
Foundation Press 2003) (1970); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., CONTRACTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS (Matthew Bender 2001) (2000); ROBERT E. SCOTT &JODY S. KRAus, CONTRACT
LAW AND THEORY (Matthew Bender 2002) (1998); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A.
HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION:THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE (Jesse
H. Choper ed.,West Group 2001) (1987).
73. See KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 72.
74. See, e.g., MAcAULY, KIDWELL & WHITORD, supra note 72, at 520-21 (providing a
special entry for "poverty" which explores Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350
E2d 445 (D.C. Cit. 1965), under the title "the poor go shopping" in the section called
"retailing and the poor," ignoring the case's racist load); see also Amy H. Kastely, Out of the
Witeness: On Raced Codes and White Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract
Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 269, 305-10 (1994) (exploring the racist load of Williams and
noting that Judge Wright, who offered her relief, mentioned neither Williams' (Black) race
nor the heavily racist barriers and burdens that even after the Civil Rights Act of 1964
"continue to affect the lives and commercial choices of [B]lack people in the District of
Columbia.").
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main entries is Problems in Contract Law by Knapp, Crystal & Prince.7 1 Of-
fering less than a page of condensed discussion of these two issues
together, 6 this is the only book to even raise the question of whether
there is room for separate contractual treatment of the problem of dis-
crimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, sexual orientation or disability.
77
And yet, the question is introduced with regard to performing an already
existing contract and overlooks the issue of refusal to even enter contrac-
tual relationship.
B. Marginalizing the Problem
Marginalizing the problem is both similar and different from ignor-
ing it altogether. It is similar in its denial of the issue at hand, which is still
perceived as not worthy of a contractual response. It is different in that it
is slightly louder than absolute silence. When marginalizing, proponents
are more vocal; they say things that one can later hear and challenge. For
instance, they might say "that race and gender discrimination is not a seri-
ous problem in retail markets," or that "today few whites are out-and-out
racists, 79 or that "people don't need affirmative action to trade with
[B]lacks." s° The tendency to downplay the harm of discriminatory con-
tractual behavior is a common response to the problem, especially among
economists and scholars who can be described as "market-oriented."81
75. See KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 72. The other two books which do
mention the problem (Without indexing it) do so briefly and in the context of other
contractual issues. See KASTELY, POST & HOM, supra note 72, at 1048 ("[Plunitive damages
may be awarded for violation of the Civil Rights Acts of 42 U.S.C. 5§ 1981, 1982, and
1983, upon a finding that the defendant's conduct was motivated by malicious intent, or
when it involved reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others."); MuRPHY, SPEI-
DEL & AYRES, supra note 72, at 586 (containing a short paragraph which mentions § 1981
as a possible ground for illegality).
76. See KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 72, at 454.
77. It does so by reference to Neil Williams' article which is discussed below. See
infra note 94.
78. See generally, KASTELY, POST & HOM, supra note 72, at 159 for an example of the
limits of the objective theory as applied to contract formation ("I grew up in a neighbor-
hood where landlords would not sign leases with their poor, [B]lack tenants .... (quoting
Patricia Williams, Alchemical Note: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 401,408 (1987)).While this book is written with great social sensitivity
and rare racial awareness, there is no further discussion of this pre-contractual problem.
79. See STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND
WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE 530-31 (Simon & Schuster 1997).
80. See id. at 450.
81. See, e.g., AYisS, supra note 20, at 3.
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C. Anti-Antidiscrimination: The Problem will Solve Itself
Some scholars have argued that to the extent that discrimination ex-
ists, the marketplace is efficient enough to deal with it and ultimately
solve it. 2 This hopeful view can be seen not only as overly
optimistic, 3 but also as hiding a harsher idea that is truly resistant to laws
that aim to forbid discrimination via interference with the "free market"
Saying that the free market will take care of discrimination becomes a
pretext for regulating hostility-hostility that is not conditioned on the
actual performance of the market. One of the provocative preachers of
this idea is Prof. Richard Epstein who argues that anti-discrimination laws
create more injustices than they can repair."4
Epstein, who describes himself as "unreconstructed defender of Lais-
sez faire,,8' and who, like other strong believers in autonomy theories,
stresses the right of each individual to choose and argues that "[a]n anti-
discrimination law is the antithesis of freedom of contract, a principle that
allows all persons to do business with whomever they please for good
reason, bad reason or no reason at all. 86 Epstein makes his case against the
use of civil rights laws in this context. From his point of view the focus
on civil rights conceals the aspect of the duties which have to be imposed
on the other end. He writes: "We cannot simply pair human rights to a
set of correlative duties on abstract bodies, hoping thereby to externalize
their costs on no one in particular.
87
Epstein's arguments illustrate the situation in contrasting colors. For
him, equality is too costly and the main problem is that the equation be-
tween benefits (decreasing discrimination) and costs (less liberty) is rarely
82. See, e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A LIBERTARIAN: A PERSONAL
INTERPRETATION 82-83 (Broadway Books 1997); see also THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra
note 79. The thesis that these books share is critically discussed in Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's
Roadmap: Is the Marketplace Theory for Eradicating Discrimination a Blind Alley?, 93 Nw. U. L.
REv. 215 (1998) (confronting the contention made by law and economics works that free
markets will correct discrimination since there are grounds of human behavior, specifically
racist behavior, that are not economic in nature and that set off people to make economi-
cally unfavorable decisions).
83. Some scholars argued explicitly that the free market cannot cope with discrimi-
nation without external help. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSrEIN, FREE MARKETS & SOCIAL JUSTICE
151-66 (Oxford Press 1997); Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Dis-
crimination, Market Efficiency and Social Change, 103 YALE LJ. 595,648 (1993).
84. See, e.g., RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY OR MORE OPPORTUNITY? THE
GOOD THING ABOUT DISCRIMINATION (Civitas 2002).
85. Id. at 36.
86. RiCHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYER DIs-
CRIMINATION LAWS 3 (1992). For a critical review of Epstein's ideas as presented in this
book see George Rutherglen, Abolition in a Different Voice, 78 VA. L. REY. 1463 (1992)
(book review).
87. EPSTEIN, supra note 84, at 4.
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or never done. 8 Epstein goes on to say: "when the cost elements of a
modern human rights statute are allowed to enter into any equation, they
are never placed on the same footing as the rights side." 9 He then engages
himself in what he sees as "a closer comparison" of"[t]he modern statu-
tory rights that guarantee freedom from discrimination with those which
allow persons to make contracts to dispose of their labour or property.' ' 0
These words expose the sort of attitude that is typical to market followers.
The right "to make contracts" (Epstein's words) was promised to Blacks
under the Thirteenth Amendment, while Blacks are also the ones who
need most the "freedom from discrimination" (Epstein's words again).
Therefore, the argument quoted above creates unjustified opposition and
confrontation between two ideas that were supposed to serve the same
purpose. From this alleged opposition emerges the conclusion that "the
anti-discrimination norm is heavily parasitic on the basic right to trade"
and the first should be suppressed by the later.9 '
Epstein then calls not only for the abolishment of these "parasitic"
rules but also for the enactment of a new rule that will explicitly permit
refusal to contract with a person out of discriminatory tastes. The sug-
gested statute would flagrantly say: "Every individual and group may
refuse to contract or associate with, or to otherwise discriminate for or
against any other group or individual for whatever reasons they see fit,
including without limitation, race, creed, sex, religion, disability, marital
status, or sexual orientation."
92
Needless to say that not all the market sympathetic scholars agree ei-
ther with the "Epsteinian" endless trust in the powers of the market or
with his aversion to antidiscrimination laws. 93 However, when dealing
with the question of the lack of contractual response to the problem of
discrimination, acquaintance with this (loud) line of thinking is apposite,
especially if one wishes to call for a more attentive response.
D. Summary: Contractual Hush
In his 1994 article, Prof. Neil Williams not only takes discrimination
seriously and as inherent to the realm of contracts, but he also points
88. Other than the damage to liberty, the cost of the administration of the antidis-
crimination law is "hundreds of millions of pounds in foregone economic efficiency ...."
EPSTEIN, supra note 84, at 16.
89. Id. at 5.
90. Id. at 5.
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 11.
93. See, e.g., Simon Deakin, Equality, Non-discrimination, and the Labour Market: a
Commentary on Richard Epstein's Critique of Anti-discrimination Laws, in EPSTEIN, supra note
84, at 41-56; SUNSTEIN, supra note 83; Delgado, supra note 82.
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S94critically to the absence of contractual case law on this point. He calls
attention to the need to use contractual tools and contractual remedies in
order to combat discrimination more successfully. Writing exclusively on
racial discrimination and focusing on situations in which a contract was
already made, 9' as opposed to the pre-contractual phase discussed in this
Article, Williams suggests a common law model for the prohibition of
racial discrimination.
Apart from Williams' work and few other exceptional scholars who
paid contractual attention to discriminatory practices, 96 it seems that the
vast majority of people who influence contract doctrine-legislators,
judges, lawyers and scholars-still share the conception that discrirmina-
tions is not a contractual issue but rather "something else," completely
isolated from contracts' reality.97 It is possible to speculate that this con-
ception has a lot to do with the ideological role of contract law in a
capitalist society. This hypothesis feeds on the traditional legal structure of
the dilemma, which will now be explored.
III. THE TRADITIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE DILEMMA
The divorce of contract law from discrimination issues and the sepa-
ration between antidiscrimination laws on the one hand and contractual
principles on the other is the external layer, the wrapping, of a deeper
ideological structure upon which the legal norms are founded. Beneath
this external layer several dominant dichotomies are to be found and they
will be described now.
94. Neil G. Williams, Offer, Acceptance, and Improper Considerations: A Common-Law
Model for the Prohibition of Racial Discrimination in the Contracting Process, 62 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 183 (1994).
95. But see id. at 222 (pointing to two cases which "provide evidence that some
courts, if confronted with the appropriate case, may well be prepared at least to acknowl-
edge that contract law prohibits racial discrimination by parties who have entered into
contracts") (emphasis added).
96. In his book The Limits of Freedom of Contract, Prof. Trebilcock dedicates an entire
chapter to this problem, which he sees as "one of the most difficult domestic policy issues
now facing many industrialized societies." See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 188 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993). Prof. Ayres' book Pervasive Preju-
dice, which is based on his earlier empirical works, also highlights the commercial sides of
the problem although his work is less focused on contractual doctrine.What makes Ayres'
work exceptional in comparison to the standard silence is his empirical contribution to
our understanding of how intense and pervasive the problem is. See AYRES, supra note 20.
97. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Harris, Shopping Wile Black:Applying 42 US.C. 5 1981 to
Cases of Consumer Racial Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 18-19 (2003) ("[I]t is un-
clear that the law will evolve to incorporate a proscription against racial discrimination
.... .).
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A. Private v. Public
The total separation between civil rights and contracts can also be
described along the lines of the public/private dichotomy which the law
tends to maintain. The discourse of equality, discrimination, racism, social
justice and the like remained confined to the public sphere-it did not
intrude into the private realm of contracts, market and commerce.
The genesis of this hermetic separation of public from private in the
contractual discrimination context lay in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883.9
Remarkably, each of these five cases evolved from discriminatory (and
racist) refusals to contract on the part of private people or companies. Each
of the cases involved the rejection of a Black person from the market: in
two cases, admittance to the dress circle in a theater and to an opera
house; in two additional cases, accommodation in an inn or hotel; and in
the fifth case, access to the ladies' car of the train. Essential to the under-
standing of the way in which the dilemma was structured is the fact that
despite these "private" circumstances-private actors denying the partici-
pation of private Black people in the private market-the whole legal
debate took place on the "public" level.
First, four of the five cases were criminal cases in which the decision
to prosecute the discriminators was the focal point. Second, and more
importantly, the discussion focused on the constitutional question of the
power of Congress to legislate the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in light of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, it almost goes without saying that the
contractual implications of the cases, such as essential questions of free-
dom of contract and market functionality, were not even mentioned. .
In a decision that was to afford the private sector immunity for the
next 85 years from legal suits founded on grounds of discrimination, the
Supreme Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, holding that
the Act, because it applied to private, not state action, was beyond Con-
gress' Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. The sad result was, to
quote Tsesis, that: "private business owners who refused to provide
[B]lacks with goods and services were now protected by state indifference
or outright support for discriminatory practices. ' 99
Thirteen years after the Civil Rights Cases' decision, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the public classification of the issue of discrimination
when it held in Plessyloo that the rights to make contracts and to own
property are only protected against state action, but not against discrimi-
nation by private people. The narrow interpretation of Plessy limited the
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
This constricted view was imposed in a manner similar to that taken in
98. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
99. Tsesis, supra note 26, at 337.
100. Plessy, 163 U.S. 537.
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the Civil Rights Cases' holding," 1 in which the court had limited the
scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. The restrictive interpretation had
two prongs: first, and most pragmatically, equality was to be enforced only
against public discriminators; and second, and more theoretically, dis-
crimination was perceived as a public problem.
The first aspect, the refusal to impose nondiscriminatory behavior
on private people, stood for many decades until it was overturned in 1968,
when the Supreme Court published its Jones decision."" For the first time
the Court made it clear that private people were subject to the legal orders
of non-discrimination. The public/private dichotomy regarding who was
doing the discriminating was eliminated, and an undivided legal space
created within which discrimination was forbidden irrespective of the
discriminators' characteristics. On the other hand, and in sharp contrast to
this achievement, in terms of the second aspect of Plessy referred to
above-to this day there has still been no change. Thus, as I argue here,
discrimination continues to be perceived as a public problem, rather than a
103private one.
What makes the patchwork of civil right statutes discussed above
appear as a "public" issue? First, it is in the name. All of those Civil Rights
Acts are codified under Title 42 of the U.S.C., significantly entitled "The
Public Health and Welfare." Second, as a more nuanced look will demon-
strate, the goal of Title II was and still is to defeat discrimination in the
public arena, which in the legal jargon is defined, most meaningfully, as
"places of public accommodation." The focus of antidiscrimination statutes
such as Title 1I on "public" accommodation reflects the fact that the dis-
crimination they try to overcome is perceived as a public problem which
happens in a public space. 1 4 Third, the civil rights laws are categorized as
belonging to the core of what is often called "public law" as they are
taken to address public policy concerns.
With all these public features combined, the patchwork of antidis-
crimination rules was completely detached from contract law, from the
shrine of "private law." The public problem of discrimination was and still
101. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
102. Jones, 392 U.S. at 443; see supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural
Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to "Private" Regulation, 71 U. CoLo. L. Rav. 1263,
1268 (2000) ("[M]ost Americans are likely to resist, on an intuitive level, scholarly attempts
to erode the distinction between public and private.") (emphasis added). Note that, to the
extent that the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to protect the rights of dis-
criminated groups, its coverage is still restricted to the "public" sphere and is actionable
only against "public" discriminators.
104. See Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§5 12101-2213 (2000)) (Title 1I is the main, but not the only statute, in which the con-
cept of "public accommodation" plays a major role); King, supra note 23, at the text
accompanying footnote 13 ("The meaning of two terms, 'public accommodation' and
'place of public accommodation,' are key to determining the coverage ofTitle III.").
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is covered by public norms: these public norms and the private rules of
the market are currently like parallel lines destined never to meet.
B. Economic v. Social
While the market is an economic feature upon which the whole
existence of modern economy is dependant, the phenomenon of dis-
crimination is for the most part a social one and the battle against it is
conceptualized as a social goal. '°0 Because traditional contract doctrine is
often accepted as the representation of the free-market ideology,0 6 the
distinction between economic considerations and social concerns is par-
ticularly typical to contract law. Especially when analyzed by law and
economics scholars, contract law seems to have a natural connection to
economic concerns and a corresponding degree of alienation from social
ideas. The same is true of another dichotomy-that of efficiency and fair-
ness: contract law is supposed to be efficient, while the attempt to secure
equality is an issue of fairness.
Truly, the Lochner15 7 days are gone and expansive critical work has
been done to add social sensitivity to the old laissez-faire contractual prin-
ciples. However, inasmuch as we are dealing with the structure of things,
it is economic activity and not social goals that he at the core of contract
law. This economic/social division is of course strongly linked to the sepa-
ration of private and public areas of law discussed above, but it still is
worthy of special emphasis. After all, one of the provocative arguments
made against antidiscrimination laws is based exactly on the economic
quality of contract law and the social nature of discrimination. As we saw
earlier, according to Prof. Epstein's argument, interrupting the economic
function of the market by imposing prohibitions of discrimination based
on social motives results in severe economic losses which, in turn, justify
the abolition of such prohibitions. 10
105. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991). Arguing for the need to
prohibit discrimination that is based on foreign accent, Prof. Matsuda tells the story of Mr.
Fragante who, despite his fine education, was turned down for a clerk job in the Division
of MotorVehicles because of his Filipino accent.Vis-i-vis the economic/social dichotomy,
she says: "his story ends in Title VII litigation, not in the triumphant recognition of his
talents by the free market." Id. at 1333.
106. See, e.g., Peter Gabel & Jay Fineman, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW 496 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
107. Lochner v. NewYork, 198 U.S. 45 (1904).
108. See infra Part II.C.
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C. 'hite v. Black
By saying earlier that this Article is not restricted to discrimination
on the grounds of race I did not mean to underestimate the severity of
racial discrimination, particularly that of Blacks, in this context. As many
have shown, African Americans are by far the most discriminated group in
the market.0 9 More specifically, as the Staples Case may suggest, African
Americans, more than any "Others," such as the disabled or elderly,'1 0 suf-
fer from the problem of refusal to contract. For example, in a recent
article Prof. Harris described the experience of what she called "Shopping
While Black":
White Americans are largely unaware of their privileged status
in the marketplace. Most of the time, [W]hite consumers can
run errands, shop, dine out, and take in a show with the expec-
tation of at least minimally appropriate service in the
establishments where they spend their money. However, Afri-
can American consumers' patronage and money are somehow
regarded as less valuable than that of the [Wihite consumer. In
fact, "shopping while [B]lack" involves some of the same risks
associated with the better-known phenomenon of "driving
while [B]lack." Shoppers of color are viewed with suspicion
and, as a result, they are more likely to be watched, followed,
harassed, and even denied service in the course of their daily
roles as consumers."'
This racial dimension of the problem is especially significant in light
of the particular background of sections 1981 and 1982 that were meant
to assure that "a dollar in the hands of a Negro will purchase the same
thing as a dollar in the hands of a white man.",112 Recalling the allegations
109. See, e.g., Regina Austin, A Nation of Thieves: Securing Black People's Right to Shop
and to Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 147, 148-50; Graves, supra note 61, at 161.
For a discussion of reasons for the poor economic situation of Blacks in America see W
Sherman Rogers, The Black Quest for Economic Liberty: Legal, Historical, and Related Consid-
erations, 48 How. L.J. 1, 10 (2004) ("Black individuals, when compared to their [W]hite
counterparts, experience twice the rate of unemployment, have substantially lower per-
sonal and family income, are three times more likely to live in poverty, and possess only
one-fifth of the net worth of [W]hites.") (footnotes omitted).
110. Naturally, a combination of several kinds of "otherness" is the worst-for in-
stance trying to contract as a Black, elderly, handicapped woman.
111. Harris, supra note 97, at 2-3 (footnotes omitted).
112. See, e.g., Jones, 392 U.S. at 443:
Negro citizens, North and South, who saw in the Thirteenth Amendment a
promise of freedom-freedom to 'go and come at pleasure' and to 'buy and
sell when they please'-would be left with 'a mere paper guarantee' if Con-
gress were powerless to assure that a dollar in the hands of a Negro will
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against the racist motives of Mrs. Murphy," ' one can paint a very gloomy
picture. That is, while the marketplace is predominantly White, the dis-
crimination therein is mainly directed against Blacks.
D. Summary: Multilayered Segregation
As we have just seen, the division between contract law and the
problem of discrimination is multilayered. Each of the dichotomies dis-
cussed above in itself creates a division between contracts doctrine and
issues of discrimination; collectively, each reinforces the others, cumula-
tively creating a virtual abyss between the two. On one side of this abyss is
the realm of the market with its contractual rules, private nature, eco-
nomic orientation and White dominance. On the other side lies the realm
of discrimination with its civil rights statutes, public disposition, social
inclination and a majority of Black victims. The gap is deeper and more
systematic and hermetic than might seem at first glance. As I will now
argue, it is so profound that a bridging mechanism is necessary to connect
what has been detached for too long; or, in more allegorical terms-to
end the segregation.
IV RECONSTRUCTING THE DILEMMA
Intuitively, and somewhat post-modernly, if the problem is a deep
and multilayered segregation between the contractual and the constitu-
tional universe-then the solution should be sought under the lamppost
of connection and integration. Before doing so, however, it is essential
that we explore the kinds of harm caused by the current separation and
examine the warnings that lie therein. Coming next, therefore, is an ex-
amination of the incentives for reconstruction, followed by a new model
for integration.
A. The Logic: The Harm of External Treatment
The purpose of this section is not to echo and track the important
works that explore the many flaws of the current web of antidiscrimination
purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a [W]hite man. At the
very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to secure under the
Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a [W]hite
man can buy, the right to live wherever a [W] hite man can live. If Congress
cannot say that being a free man means at least this much, then the Thir-
teenth Amendment made a promise the Nation cannot keep.
Jones, 392 U.S. at 443.
113. See discussion supra Part I.D.
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laws.14 Presumably, these laws are functioning and do offer certain, albeit
probably less than sufficient, remedies." ' The focus here is on the ills
caused by the severance of contract law from discrimination, in and of
itself. For at least three reasons this lack of contractual attention, which is
so typical of the traditional structure under which discrimination is classi-
fied exclusively as a civil rights issue, is extremely disturbing.
1. Locking the Outsiders Out
The typical situation is the following: two people enter the market-
place with a contract in mind, be it a quick retail exchange or a long-
term rental transaction, but one of them refuses to contract with the other
for reasons of discriminatory "taste."This refusal hurts the other, who be-
comes an outsider unable to conduct business in the market. Remarkably,
under traditional analysis the law essentially tells the outsiders to stay out-
side and to cope with their rejection from there. They are left outside of
the marketplace, the realm of private ordering, where free individuals exe-
cute their autonomy and choices. The law offers a mechanism of civil
rights that places the victims in an arena which is completely isolated
from the one they were trying to enter.
Although both potential-parties were trying to make a contract and
were involved in a classic contractual ritual of negotiation," 6 the law's re-
sponse eradicates the contractual meaning by channeling the predicament
to public canals. By doing so the law actively perpetuates the most signifi-
cant part of the problem-the creation of disempowered outsiders. In
other words, the people who are rejected from the market are not offered
market tools that will enable them to protest and resistfrom within. Instead,
they are directed to an external arena, well-separated from the market, and
only from that distance are they allowed to knock on the gates of the
market and beg for entry.
From a contractual perspective, the people who suffer from dis-
crimination are not only left outside, they are also marginalized. Despite
114. See, e.g., Claudine Columbres, Targeting Retail Discrimination with Parens Patriae,
36 CoLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 209, 213-17 (2003); Graves, supra note 61; Deseriee A. Ken-
nedy, Consumer Discrimination: The Limitations of Federal Civil Rights Protection, 66 Mo. L.
REv. 275 (2001).
115. For recent encouraging research see Raphael W. Bostic & Richard W Martin,
Have Anti-Discrimination Housing Laws Worked? Evidence fom Trends in Black Homeownership,
31 J. OF REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 5 (2005) (studying homeownership patterns of Black and
non-Black households during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s using Census data and data that
proxies for the level of enforcement of the Fair Housing Act over time, and finding a
consistent positive relationship between fair housing policy enforcement and Black home-
ownership growth).
116. Many times, especially in the retail context, the negotiation process can be very
short or even unnoticeable. However, it is still a common social and legal ritual that nor-
mally carries contractual meaning(s).
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their contractual aspirations and the contractual situation, they own no
contractual claim, which suggests that they had no contractual right to
begin with. Compared to other parties who were rejected during the ne-
gotiation process for other, non-discriminatory reasons, they are in an
inferior position, forced to use only non-contractual legal tools.
2.The Harm to the Individual Self
Shifting the legal claim from the contractual arena to the civil rights
field transforms its nature. In the civil rights realm, in order to enjoy civil
rights remedies, the law requires that the victims define themselves as part
of a certain pre-recognized deprived group and prove they truly belong
to such a group.' 7 Here another paradox surfaces: the victims were trying
to privately and independently exercise their individual-economic selves.
The law, however, compels them to translate their failed self-invention
into a collective language and to use arguments of group-inferiority and
systematic-victimhood. They sought to achieve ordinariness---say by din-
ing or shopping--and discriminatory treatment deprived them of the
freedom to be ordinary. Now the law joins in and labels the situation as
something extraordinary, not as a contractual refusal to deal but as a civil
rights infringement.
In a liberal-Western-capitalist society such as American society, this
inability to be an autonomous agent who enjoys basic individualistic free-
doms is devastating, and stands in contradiction to the liberal
commitment to the idea that individual autonomy is vital to the con-
struction of the self. We need to remember that this was the deeper and
more basic idea of the Thirteenth Amendment-that equality comes not
only, and perhaps not even mainly, from participation in rare moments of
voting but also from the ability to lead ordinary daily lives."" When the
law's response to the problem of refusal to contract confines the rejected
parties to the world of civil rights, it also constrains them to the world of
group-oriented victims, forcing them to give up their freedom to invent
and revise their ends through reliance on their own agency and on their
ability to constitute themselves. In this sense, the law can be seen as exac-
erbating the problem of inability to fulfill one's individual self more than
helping to resolve it.
117. Focusing on 5 1981 retail cases, most courts seem to adopt the McDonnell Doug-
las framework. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-07 (1973). Within
this framework they use one of the few versions of the prima facie test. The most popular
version seems to be set in Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F3d 411,413 (7th Cir. 1996), which
on its first level, requires the plaintiff to show that he or she is a member of a racial minor-
ity group.
118. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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3. The Boomerang Effect
The outsiders who might lose their individual voice are one side of
the coin. On the flipside of the coin are the discriminators. Here the para-
dox of external versus internal returns in a different form, in a way that may
echo critical responses toward affirmative action.119 The discriminating
party comes to the marketplace seeking to do private business and ends
up being sued for infringement of the civil rights of a member of a pro-
tected minority group. Furthermore, the discriminator may face severe
punishment, far beyond the scale of the specific transaction that the dis-
criminator entered the marketplace for, since the punishment takes into
account the broad effects of discrimination on the victim's entire group.
Without in any way justifying discrimination, it is clear that from
the discriminators' perspective this legal reaction might seem exaggerated
and unfair. For merely exercising their fundamental freedom of contract
in a specific private transaction they are treated and punished as immoral
persons, and pay "tax" for centuries of social injustice that they most likely
do not see themselves responsible for in any way. This feeling of lack of
proportionality might later translate into a greater anger and resistance
directed not only at the specific plaintiff, but also at the rest of his group.
Since the plaintiff was forced-because of the contract/discrimination
dichotomy-to resort to collective norms of attack, the defense might
also be group-based and it might reinforce those beliefs that triggered the
discriminatory refusal to contract to begin with. Unsympathetic (and in-
defensible) responses, with which we are all familiar, such as "they are all
whiners" or "why won't they work harder, instead of complaining" might
follow.
1 20
The fact that the prohibition of discrimination is external, and is not
implemented deeply in the contractual field, plays a major role here: the
119. See, e.g., Eric J. Mitnick, Three Models of Group-Differentiated Rights, 35 CoLuM.
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 215, 218 (2004) (generally suggesting that "there may be a further,
largely unrecognized, moral cost associated with group-differentiated rights"). More spe-
cifically, Mitnick emphasizes that "the notion that affirmative action programs may
exacerbate already dangerous social stigmas is increasingly acknowledged as a potential moral
harm by proponents and detractors of preferential policies alike." Id. at 246-47. He adds that
"[t]his concern led Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas in one case to claim that such
'programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority,' and in another that 'because of this
policy all [[Bilacks] are tarred as undeserving.'" Id. at 247 (alteration in original) (foot-
notes omitted).
120. Responses of this kind were heard, for example, when the enactment of the Fair
Housing Act was considered. See Failinger, supra note 56, at 385-86 n.13 (remarks of Sen.
Ellender, who claimed that with the Fair Housing Act "[a]ll personal rights and liberties of
the individual are ripped away for the alleged purpose of preventing discrimination.... If
this amendment becomes law, those guaranteed rights will be nothing but lies and dead
concepts .... Equality is the last refuge of the trifling, the shiftless and the incompetent.") (empha-
sis added) (quoting 114 CONG. REC. S3135 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 1968)).
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discriminators can easily (albeit not legitimately) point a blaming finger at
their victims instead of dealing with the morality of their own business
behavior. After all, as long as the legal structure remains segregated, the
entire issue appears to have little to do with business ethics.
4. Summary: The Need for Reconstruction
If sustaining the traditional structure of different spheres is indeed
destructive to the goal of eliminating market discrimination, then clearly
the challenge is to find a way to bridge the abyss between the contractual
discourse and the civil rights/constitutional discourse.We could think of a
legal system that freely fuses the "private" and the "public" discourses and
accordingly allows a prolific discussion regarding the rights of the dis-
criminators on the one hand versus those of the victims on the other12 122
hand.' However, despite calls to do so, it seems doubtful that such a
blurring of spheres could take place in the near future under American
jurisprudence.
As long as the legal system continues to examine discriminatory
business behavior in terms of the contractual liberties of the discriminat-
ing party versus the civil rights of the discriminated party, these separate
discourses will continue to talk past each other. Therefore, the important
and urgent undertaking is to enable a more productive discourse. As I will
immediately maintain, such a discourse is possible even under the current
closed categories of contract law and constitutional law.123 What follows is
121. See, e.g., Aharon Barak, Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law, in FREEDOM
OF CONTRACT AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 105, 105-68 (Alfredo Mordechai Rabello &
Petar Sarcevic eds., 1998) (illustrating the legal public/private distinction; proposing differ-
ent models for transfusion; presenting the Israeli version of combining the spheres and
offering an expansive comparative discussion of similar approaches in different legal sys-
tems).
122. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. REv. 553, 585-86
(1933) (establishing the realist view that contract law is in reality a segment of public law);
see also Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, Social.Justice in European
Contract Law: a Manifesto, 10 EUR. L.J. 653,668 (2004) ("It is wrong to suppose that there is
a sharp separation between the public sphere of constitutional rights and the private
sphere of market relations.").
123. An alternative that goes beyond the scope of this Article is to try to construct a
constitutional model that would incorporate into the same discourse both the interests of the
discriminators and those of the discriminated. Such a model might be built along the lines
of basing the discriminators' claims in the Fourteenth Amendment, while founding the
counter-claims of the discriminated people on the Thirteenth Amendment. As things seem
to be positioned today, the constitutional discourse tends to be ineffective since the Four-
teenth Amendment is perceived ambiguously as defending, in an indecisive manner, both
the discriminators' goals and the needs of the discriminated people. Indeed, the same
Amendment was used in one instance to strike down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 on
behalf of the rights of the discriminators to have "freedom of contract," and at other times
to protect from discrimination under a loose definition of "due process." On the other
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a contractual model that seeks to bring together, to put on the same page,
the discriminators' liberties and the victims' rights. Again, my main pur-
pose in suggesting this model is to create a shared language that can be
used to discuss the issue constructively.
B. A Contractual Model:A Myriad of Freedoms of Contract
Often when people talk about the freedom of contract they refer to
some abstract notion of uninterrupted business activity, roughly akin to
the concept of laissez-faire. However, freedom in the contractual world
has, or at least should have, much more complex and nuanced meanings.
In fact, what is known as "freedom OF contract" embodies several con-
flicting freedoms that are often confused and that need to be carefully
separated and defined.
For the purposes of this Article, untying the bundle of freedoms is
crucial in order to facilitate careful exploration of their interplay. It is im-
portant to look beyond the powerful identification, reflected in the law, of
freedom of contract with the idea of free business activity, and to examine
how this common image has obscured other freedoms. Evidently, the pre-
vailing meaning was, historically, the most important for developing the
modern market. Contemporarily it is still the appropriate meaning for
seasoned players who are already active in the market and who rely on
contract law's assistance in keeping their transactions together. However,
in order to make room for more meanings and, thereby, for more people
who want to play the contractual game, it is important to destabilize this
governing meaning.
I will now try to outline a more nuanced concept of freedom, one
which incorporates three distinct "faces" of freedom in the contractual
context: freedom IN contract, freedom FROM contract and freedom TO
contract. Tracing each of these, with its own distinct logic, will help to
weave a richer fabric of contractual freedom and to afford better under-
hand, the Thirteenth Amendment that appears to be apposite for defending the discrimi-
nated people is marginalized as a piece of anachronistic history which is no longer
relevant. For a perception of the Fourteenth Amendment as defending the Lochnerian ideal
of laissez:faire see Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term, Forward: Fashioning the
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts and the Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003). For a critical
view of the Lochner era see Gregory S. Alexander, The Limits of Freedom of Contract in the
Age of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, in THE FALL AND RISE or FREEDOM Or CONTRACT 103,
106 (EH. Buckley ed., 1999) (arguing that contra to the conventional wisdom "Lochner-
ism neither began with nor defined the Lochner era"). For a very convincing illustration of
the large potential of the Thirteenth Amendment followed by a call to revive and expand
the ways to use it see Tsesis, supra note 26, at 312, who compares the Thirteenth Amend-
ment with the Fourteenth Amendment while focusing on the question of what is
protected under each of them. The outline for the constitutional model suggested here is
centered on the question of who (or which group) is protected by each of the amend-
ments.
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standing of the contractual game vis-a-vis discriminated groups. Termino-
logically, I will try to avoid the use of "freedom OF contract," which is
concerned with the prevailing meaning. When I do use this term it will
be to signify the traditional dominant meaning which I believe to be too
narrow and excluding.
1. Freedom IN Contract
The freedom of designing the transaction, establishing its terms,
choosing the words that accurately describe the deal, and the like, is often
described as the "first" contractual freedom. It is this sense of freedom,
which I will call the freedom IN contract, that best correlates with the
common use of "freedom OF contract."
The above description of the freedom IN contract emphasizes an
active concept of freedom, a Hohfeldian 1 25 human power to choose the set
of actions that will better fulfill the party's goals. In political theory terms,
as well as philosophically, this is a "positive" sense of freedom.Yet, empha-
sizing this active-positive aspect should not veil the "negative" nature of
this type of freedom. From this perspective the freedom IN contract is
more a freedom from intervention, the freedom to design one's transac-
tion without constraints imposed by the government or any institution
thereof. In fact, the government is even expected to enforce such agree-
ments and its refusal to do so in extreme cases, such as in the case of
illegal contracts, is then perceived as intervention. 26 The freedom IN con-
tract can therefore be seen as a mixed freedom-aspects of it are positive
but it has an important negative quality which has a significant bearing on
the issue of discrimination.
If a legal system outlaws discriminatory refusals to contract it clearly
imposes a constraint on one's freedom to choose with whom to do busi-
ness. Nonetheless, what is essential here is to notice how thin a slice out
of the whole loaf of "freedom IN contract" this specific freedom consti-
tutes. As the Staples Case 2 illustrates, a seller can be constrained from
rejecting a Black buyer who offers an out-of-state check (if White buyers
124. Omri Ben-Shahar, FOREWARD: Freedomfrom Contract, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 261,
263 (2004).
125. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS AP-
PLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (David Campbell & Philip Thomas eds., Ashgate 2001)
(1913) (Hohfeldian study of human rights).
126. This is indeed the classical view of intervention. For an elaborate discussion of
an opposite, realist analysis see Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation
and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1777-78 (1997) (discussing Cohen's 1933
article, "The Basis of Contract," supra note 122, according to which any enforcement of a
contract by the state is an act of intervention).
127. Williams, 372 F3d 662.
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are not similarly rejected), but the seller still retains almost unlimited free-
dom regarding every other aspect of the deal.
The realization that freedom IN contract has the quality of a nega-
tive freedom can sharpen our understanding of how narrow the freedom
we jeopardize is when prohibiting discriminatory rejections. What is at
stake here is significantly narrower: people can freely choose their con-
tractual partners as long as they do not reject potential partners on the
grounds of their belonging to groups which have historically suffered
from systemic disadvantage or oppression (What Trebilcock calls "histori-
cal denial of participation"). 28
Furthermore, the weight of this limited restriction needs to be con-
textualized in order to be appropriately appreciated. Here, in the spirit of
relational contracts approach, 129 the intensity of the relationship of the
parties is the major factor: the more discrete the transaction, the narrower
the actual restriction on freedom entailed in forbidding discrimination.
For example, if a business like Staples sells millions of printer cartridges to
millions of unidentified clients, then the limitation of Staples' freedom IN
contract-if required to contract with a Black client-entails inconse-
quential harm, even before we attempt to weigh it against the harm to the
Black buyer who was rejected. At the other extreme lie the most rela-
tional contracts, such as lifelong two-person partnerships, in which the
freedom to choose one's partner is at the heart of the contract and consti-
tutes a considerable portion of the freedom IN contract. Agreements of
this kind are, of course, much rarer than the vast majority of market-
transactions.
To summarize, in most cases the freedom IN contract that needs to
be taken into account when a contractual antidiscrimination norm is
considered is significantly narrower than the clich& of the freedom OF
contract.
2. Freedom FROM Contract
In a recent symposium dedicated to the topic of "freedom from
contract" 130 many of the contributors asked themselves "what is freedom
from contract?" The announcement by the symposium defined freedom
FROM contract as "the ability of parties to make legally unenforceable
128. TREBILCOCK, supra note 96, at 190.
129. See Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CaL. L. REV. 691 (1974)
(the pioneering work which identified the important distinction between discrete and
relational transactions).
130. The symposium titled "Freedom From Contract" took place at the University
of Wisconsin Law School on February 7, 2004 and the papers were later published in a
symposium issue (2004 Wis. L. Rev.).
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promises, but still left room for many interpretations and definitions.
This type of freedom, also referred to as the "secondary freedom,"' 132 can
also be described as a negative freedom, especially when the "unenforce-
able" component of the definition is emphasized. That is, the absence of
enforcement marks the boundaries of a realm protected from governmen-
tal interference.
Although its underlying negative character, i.e. the right to act unin-
terruptedly, makes it very well-rooted in traditional liberal thinking, this
face of contractual freedom has until recently been much less explored.'33
It seems that as long as traditional contractual ideas such as laissez-faire
ideology and a strict dichotomy between the pre-contractual and the
contractual were widely accepted, the freedom FROM contract was taken
for granted. This, of course, has much to do with the "Will Theory" in
contract doctrine, since the concept of imposed contract-the antonym
of freedom FROM contract-is contradictory to the belief that what le-
gitinmizes contractual enforcement is the fact that the obligations are
willed by the parties.1
3 4
The coupling of the freedom FROM contract with the issue of dis-
crimination is clear: it is this kind of freedom which is employed when
someone decides to abandon the negotiations before they reach the point
of contract. It is exactly this strand of freedom that would be threatened if
contract doctrine absorbed antidiscrimination norms and banned dis-
criminatory refusal to contract. Thus, in the discrimination context, the
freedom FROM contract serves the discriminator and not the rejected
counterpart.' 35 Similar to the case of freedom IN contract, here too it is
the discriminator's point of view that is reflected in the freedom.
131. Todd D. Rakoff, Is "Freedom from Contract" Necessarily a Libertarian Freedon?, 2004
Wis. L. REV. 477, 481 (2004) (quoting the announcement while maintaining that its text
might have many meanings).
132. Ben-Shahar, supra note 124, at 263.
133. See Rakoff, supra note 131, at 481.
134. The Will Theory of contract is based on the liberal ethos. According to this
theory, people are required by the law of contracts to keep their promises because they
freely undertook them as autonomous moral agents. See generally CHARLES FRIED, CON-
TRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981) (advocating a liberal
theory of contract); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CON-
TRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 206, 223-35 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) (adding a critical view of
the liberal theory).
135. Note that contextualizing is crucial in freedom analysis. For example, looking at
contractual situations, as opposed to pre-contractual circumstances, it was observed that
the freedom FROM contract may benefit weaker parties, such as consumers and employ-
ees, from the practical implications of the stronger party's exercise of its "freedom IN
contract" (to use this Article's terminology). In this last context, the weaker party's freedom
FROM contract means "not to be subject to contractual limitations to which his or her
consent represents at best (in Weber's terminology) the purely formal exercise of a formal
right." See Rakoff, supra note 131, at 493.
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The discriminator's argument in support of his right to discriminate,
by rejecting counterparties that do not match his preferences, is en-
trenched in the Will Theory. To use Ben-Shahar's words: "If an individual's
choice to refrain from a contract is constrained, that is, if an obligation
arises to promote a social, rather than a private concern, the autonomy of
this individual is diminished."1 3 6 This line of argument may not be con-
vincing, however, to the point of allowing discrimination, since the basic
contract was willed by the discriminator who wanted to sell or buy or rent.
In such a case the restriction of choice is especially limited, for the dis-
criminator's negative will is based only upon a single trait of the
counterparty, such as the counterparty's race or disability. As Ben-Shahar
persuasively points out: "So long as individuals are not bound to enter into
negotiations and are not submitted to arbitrary transfers, the self-imposed
nature of contractual and precontractual obligations remains by and large
,,137
secure.
3. Freedom TO Contract
What I now suggest to independently call the "freedom TO con-
tract" is a genus of contractual freedom that is seldom, if ever, discussed as
a stand-alone feature. By saying freedom TO contract I refer to the basic
ability of individuals to engage themselves in a contractual relationship: in
making a desired transaction; in simply buying, renting, borrowing, being
hired or being served.
Historically, the freedom TO contract was not available to special
groups who were perceived as unable to participate in the process of con-
tractual decision-making. 13 This freedom goes unnoticed, even today,
because for too long a time it has been taken for granted. The reason for
this seems to be rooted in the perspective of those who define the mar-
kets upon which we all rely: business people, economists, jurists, and so
on. These dominant players, who are, in a manner of speaking, the de-
scendents of those who established the modern market, do not have to
worry about not being able to participate in it-without them there is no
market. For the established participants, the freedom TO contract was, and
still is, always available, and therefore, for them, the component of freedom
IN contract (usually called the "freedom OF contract") colors the entire
issue of contractual freedom.
136. Ben-Shahar, supra note 124, at 267.
137. Id.
138. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1120 (1997) (arguing that it was his-
torically understood that economic rights were those exercised by economic men, such as
those able to own property, enter into contracts and vote-which did not realistically
include the Black man during the relevant era).
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The newer recognition of "freedom FROM contract" seems to
emerge from the same perspective. It represents the fear of "too much"
contract law-a fear of veteran participants in the market. Meaningfully,
one of the leading arguments in support of protecting the freedom
FROM contract is based on the concern that its absence will deter people
from taking part in the market. This clearly assumes that the active par-
ticipation of many is valuable for the functioning of the market, but,
again, the very ability of people to do so is considered as a given.
On the other hand, the freedom TO contract cannot be taken for
granted by those who are deprived of it. In the same manner it once was
a crucially missing freedom for all women who lost it upon getting mar-
ried139-it is nowadays an essential freedom if one is, for example, a Black
person who carries a name such as Williams. People like Jesse Williams,
who was rejected by Staples, 40 or Patricia Williams, who was refused by
Benetton,"' suffer constantly from a lack of freedom TO contract and
learn to appreciate the ability to contract.
The story about the different contractual attitudes of Peter Gabel• 142
and Patricia Williams can nicely illustrate the point. As told by Williams,
the two law professors, who just moved to Manhattan were comparing
their "apartment-renting" experiences. Peter, as a White male with axio-
matic freedom TO contract preferred to employ his freedom FROM
contract by not signing a formal agreement, while Patricia, as a Black
woman, took pleasure in her relatively new ability to employ her freedom
TO contract. As Williams says: "Unlike Peter, I am still engaged in a strug-
gle to set up transactions at arms' length, as legitimately commercial, and
to portray myself as a bargainer of separate worth, distinct power, suffi-
cient rights to manipulate commerce, rather than to be manipulated as the
object of commerce."'
43
The less-known part of the story, the piece that did not find way to
the Alchemy of Race and Rights, is that Williams herself, and not only her
neighbors, was deprived from her freedom TO contract when the land-
lady from whom she attempted to rent an apartment in Madison,
Wisconsin realized that she was actually Black. 
44
139. See, e.g., Hila Keren, Textual Harassment: A New Historicist Reappraisal of the Parol
Evidence Rule with Gender in Mind, 13 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 251 (2005).
140. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (discussing Staples' refusal to ac-
cept an out-of-state check from Jesse Williams (but not from White people)).
141. See WILLIAMS, supra note 47, at 44-51 (discussing how Patricia Williams was
refused entry to a Benetton clothing store).
142. See Patricia Williams, Alchemical Note: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HAsv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401,408 (1987).
143. Id. at 408.
144. See HILA KEREN, CONTRACT LAW FROM A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 322-23 (2005,
in Hebrew) (quoting a letter from Prof.Williams to the author):
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Many scholars who have alluded to the nuanced nature of contrac-
tual freedom have entirely neglected the freedom TO contract. Even
Rakoff and Ben-Shahar, for example, who wrote with great sensitivity on
how the freedom OF contract is not one freedom, did not explore the
issue of freedom TO contract separately from their analysis of the freedom
FROM contract.145
Nevertheless, despite the fact that it often remains unnoticed, the
freedom TO contract is crucial for participation in society, especially
given its capitalistic and materialistic traits. As the legislators realized al-
most a century and a half ago when abolishing slavery, one cannot be free
without the freedom to participate, through contracts, in the economic
activity that enables progress. It needs to be noted again that this was the
exact historical reasoning behind the enactment of the Thirteenth
Amendment and the subsequent statutes that were designed to implement
it.146 Put more philosophically, the freedom TO contract can be seen as
adapting the basic impulse of liberalism-the assumption that free agency
of the individual is the primary and perhaps only way to achieve self-
Re the apartment hunt: ... When I moved to the University ofWisconsin in
Madison, Wisconsin, I phoned in answer to an advertisement, was enthusias-
tically greeted by the woman on the other end, agreed to meet at once.
Twenty minutes later I was waiting on the doorstep. I spotted the landlady
before she spotted me. She was walking briskly, caught sight of me, and
slowed perceptibly. She walked slower and slower and by the time she made
it over to me, she refused to show me the place, saying she had made a mis-
take and had decided to rent the place to a man, who 'could shovel the snow'
in the winter.
I couldn't prove much so I basically tried to forget about it until I was de-
scribing my strong suspicion that this was racial discrimination about two or
three weeks later. I was talking about it in the faculty lounge, and Linda
Greene, the other [B]lack woman on the faculty who had just moved to
town, overheard and began to describe the place to me. Over on this street?
Little bay windows? green shutters? Anyway, the long and the short of it is
that Linda had had exactly the same experience, with the same woman, a
week or so before. She too had been told that there had been a mistake, that
the apartment had already been rented ....
145. Ben-Shahar touches upon the subject when he mentions that a threat to the
autonomy of the relying party may justify a restriction upon the other party's freedom
FROM contract, the freedom to abandon the negotiation. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 124,
at 267. Rakoff, supra note 131, at 481, discusses the freedom OF contract and the freedom
FROM contract, but his version of the later freedom is fairly sympathetic to the problem
of inequality. Interestingly, when Rakoff's analysis was later described by others, he was
taken as arguing on behalf of the freedom to contract of the people with unequal bargain-
ing power. See lain Ramsey, "Productive Disintegration" and the Law of Contract, 2004 Wis. L.
REv. 495, 503 ("[R]ules enforcing freedom from contract may be consistent with signifi-
cant state regulation to ensure that individuals are able to exercise freedom to contract and
make autonomous choices .... ") (emphasis added).
146. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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fulfillment. This notion can place the freedom TO contract close to the
freedoms discussed above, emphasizing the need to refrain from imposing
constraints on human endeavors.
Seen from this perspective, perhaps all that is needed is to allow
people to contract and to remove physical and legal constraints that pre-
vent them from doing so. That is, declaring that the ex-slave or the
married-woman are no longer incapable of making contracts, for instance,
is all that is needed in order to bestow the freedom TO contract upon
them. However, this is probably not enough. Comparing the freedom TO
contract with the two other freedoms explored earlier, it is quite evident
that the negative aspect of this freedom is much less dominant and its
positive side is considerably more significant. When contract law offers to
support the citizens' contractual will by actively enforcing their promises
to each other, it does more than just allow activity. It plays a positive role.
By handing the power of the state to the individuals, the law expands the
range of voluntary activities in which people are free to engage.
Conversely, refraining from legal intervention by allowing discrimination
creates the opposite effect: it reduces the scope of freedom.
The theoretical and political foundations of both the freedom IN
contract and the freedom FROM contract are libertarian, especially inas-
much as they are based on negative forms of freedom. The philosophical
underpinning of the freedom TO contract, on the other hand, breaks
away from the traditional liberal framework. The grounds for such a free-
dom are to be found in "progressive" conceptions of freedom. The
progressive idea of freedom asserts that no meaningful individual choice
in the liberal sense can be made under improper social and economic
conditions. The progressives have maintained that the traditional liberal
ideal of minimal constraint does not take into account these social and
economic restraints even though such restraints are potentially more
harmful than governmental limitations. 147 From this perspective, egalitar-
ian principles are essential components of freedom. Freedom means much
more than non-constraint, and thus has a positive nature.
The positive nature of the freedom TO contract makes this freedom
essential to the constitution of an autonomous member of our society. It
allows people to self-determine their future and enables them to direct
their lives in accordance with their individual choices and goals. Holding
to this perception of the freedom TO contract sharpens awareness of the
fact that the people who are deprived of this basic freedom are seriously
weakened and restricted. They are not free. The problem is well illustrated
147. See, e.g., ROBIN L. WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS
oF FoRMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 5 (2003) (confronting governmental
responsibility to improve society along egalitarian lines with the liberal obsession to define
freedom as non-intervention, and arguing, for example, that courts "regarded the threat to
freedom posed by minimum wage laws as a greater danger to individual freedom than the
threat posed to individual survival by sub-minimum wages .
FALL 2005]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
in the racial context by the following words of Prof. Chase: "Instead of
being the vehicle by which ideals of liberty, equality, and autonomy could
be fostered, the courts and dominant constructions of contract law be-
came the means by which African Americans became inalienably
disempowered; outsiders to the system of justice and equitable economic
opportunity.'
4
Returning to the problem of discrimination, it is crucial to point to
the biggest difference between the freedom IN contract and the freedom
TO contract in this context. While the former is only narrowly impinged
under a legal regime that bans rejection of potential partners out of dis-
criminatory reasons, the latter is heavily jeopardized by allowing such
rejection. In other words, if, for example, someone is deprived from rent-
ing an apartment they desire, what is lost is the entire contract, with its
accompanying significances, and not only one element of the contractual
freedom. Yet the owner of such apartment still gets to use most of her
freedom IN contract regarding all other terms of the agreement even if
she is precluded from discriminating.
In addition to comparative consideration of the different freedoms,
it is important to note another implication of the progressive theory. In
contrast to the classic liberal ideal of minimal governmental intervention,
the progressive view may necessitate additional regulatory involvement for
the purpose of achieving and expanding freedom. 149 This creates a
"merry-go-round" of freedoms-freedoms that are endlessly chasing and
escaping each other, competing forever with no prospect of definite win-
ning. Admittedly, it is an ambiguous structure that is far less clear than the
traditional cry for freedom OF contract in the sense that reached its peak
in the Lochner era: complete reluctance to limit the contractual behavior
of some (read: business people) on behalf of the contractual situation of
others (read: Others, including the working children of Lochner). The
question is, of course, if this more-confusing progressive structure can
sharpen our understanding of the complex problem of discriminatory
refusal to contract.
4.The AddedValue of Competing Freedoms
The misleading message sent by a unitary concept of freedom OF
contract was exposed long ago. For instance, it was Max Weber who in
1922 wrote:
148. Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the
Courtroom, 28 CoN,. L. PEv. 1,5-6 (1995).
149. See J.L. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in American Political and Constitutional
Thought, 45 B.C. L. Rnv. 499, 571 (2004) ("If the individual must be protected not simply
from coercive government intervention, but from a wide variety of social obstacles to
freedom, then certainly a greater degree of government involvement will be necessary to
foster individual freedom.").
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The development of the law ... toward freedom of contract
... is usually regarded as signifying a decrease of constraint and
an increase of individual freedom.... The formal empower-
ment to set the content of contracts in accordance with one's
desires ... in and of itself by no means makes sure these formal
possibilities will in fact be available to all and everyone."'
The potential contribution of thinking about three major contrac-
tual freedoms, as proposed here, lies in this gap between the formal
freedom and the socio-economic reality that eliminates this freedom for
many people.
First, the recognition of several claims for freedom, claims that are
typically held by people who differ in their position in the market, claims
with diverse combinations of negativistic and positivistic traits, "greatly
expands our analytical capabilities."'
Second, thinking about diverse freedoms relaxes the traditional op-
position between claims for freedom on the one hand and concerns of
public policy, equality, morals, distributive justice or welfare on the other
hand.' 2 By identifying and exploring the freedom TO contract we create
space for a new formulation of the problem. According to this fresh view,
when people refuse to contract with others on the grounds of their dis-
criminatory "tastes," what is at stake is freedom, contractual freedom, on
both sides. These contractual freedoms, those of the discriminators who
seek to be free to choose not to contract with people they do not want to
have a relationship with, as well as those of the rejected people who are
denied the opportunity to contract, are still in deep competition. How-
ever, they can now be understood as stemming from the same belief in
the value of contractual freedom. The new structure stands, of course, in
marked contrast to the liberal conviction that freedom and equality are
mutually antagonistic values. This decrease of confrontation provides, in
and of itself, a better chance for mutual respect and for reduced hostility."3
150. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SocIETY 729 (Guenter Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
1978) (1922).
151. Rakoff, supra note 131, at 492.
152. See, e.g., Kirsten L. McCaw, Freedom of Contract Versus the Antidiscrimination Princi-
ple:A Critical Look at the Tension Between Contractual Freedom and Antidiscrimination Provisions,
7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 195,202-03 (1996).
153. Although he did not differentiate between the freedom OF contract and the
freedom TO contract, Prof. lain Ramsay tells of a teaching experience that gives hope
along the lines suggested here.When he teaches a 1940 decision of the Canadian Supreme
Court that upheld a refusal of a tavern owner to serve Blacks,
[The] students usually conceptualize it as a case of liberty (of the tavern
owner) versus equality (for the [B]lack consumer), or liberty versus state in-
tervention. However, transforming the dialogue into freedom from contract
(for the tavern owner) trumping freedom to contract (for the [B]lack con-
sumer) reflects the unavoidable conflict between freedoms embedded in the
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Third, from the perspective of the rejected persons who recently
suffered from discrimination, locating a more precise ground for their
claim might result in a better understanding of it, as well as an improved
ability to appreciate its strength. The translation of the claim of equality
into the contractual language facilitates a nuanced balancing of that claim
against the traditional argument of freedom OF contract. Once the free-
doms are discussed in tandem, using the same contractual logic and the
same professional language, it becomes harder to dismiss out of hand,
within the contractual sphere, the claim that previously did not have a
contractual name.
The logical transition made here may be compared to the powerful
1155
argument made back in 1875, M and repeated ever since, ' in order to
defend and strengthen the freedom OF contract (in the sense called here
freedom IN contract) against public policy concerns. Sir George Jessel
converted the claim for freedom into a public policy concern, saying:
It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily
those rules which say that a given contract is void as being
against public policy, because if there is one thing which more
than another public policy requires it is that men of full age
and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of
contracting .... 156
This rational effort had the ability to put the two concerns of public
policy on the same page in a way that supported the freedom of contract
by adding to it public and social meanings that many preferred to neglect.
Similarly, seeing the antidiscrimination claim not only as a public concern
but also as an internal contractual concern, based on contractual principles,
should make it more difficult to ignore.
legal construct of freedom of contract and seems to be a novel and some-
times enlightening reconceptualization for the student.
See Ramsay, supra note 145, at 503-04. Interestingly, Ramsey analyzes the discriminator's
claim for freedom under the freedom FROM contract. Albeit possible, this classification
seems problematic in light of the fact that contrary to the common use of the term "free-
dom FROM contract" here the discriminator is usually interested in having a contract,
and only insists on the right to refuse special type of potential parties out of the many
other available alternatives. Id.
154. See Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, 19 L.R. Eq. 462 (V.C.
1875).
155. See Richard A. Epstein, Contracts Small and Contracts Large: Contract Law through
the Lens of Laissez-Faire, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 25, 58 (F H.
Buckley ed., 1999) (modern application of Sir George Jessel's argument in Printing & Nu-
merical Registering Co. v. Sampson, 19 L.R.-Eq. 462); supra Part II.C (discussion of Epsteinms
resistance to the regulation of antidiscrimination norms).
156. Printing & Numerical Registering Co., 19 L.R.-Eq. at 465.
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V SUPPORTING THE FREEDOM TO CONTRACT
After exposing, defining and naming the freedom TO contract, the
next task is to find a way to incorporate it into the current contract doc-
trine. The suggestion below is to include the protection of this freedom in
the duty to negotiate in good faith. It is further proposed to utilize the
no-retraction model recently presented by Omri Ben-Shahar as an addi-
tional justification for making such a move.
A. The Precontractual Duty of Negotiating in Good-Faith
One way to support the freedom TO contract of people discrimi-
nated against is to conceptualize the discriminators' refusal to contract as a
breach of their duty to negotiate in good faith.1 7 The general idea is that
in a good faith regime the contracting parties "are no strangers. They have
to be considerate towards each other.""1 8 Under such a view, the discrimi-
nator's behavior shall be perceived as an illegitimate contractual practice
that carries liability. The presence of the discriminator in the market-
through offering to sell goods, provide a service, rent an apartment or hire
an employee, as leading examples-is to be theorized, under such analysis,
as constituting a contractual negotiations process. The discriminator's
withdrawal from such negotiations, if done for discriminatory reasons,
should in turn be considered as illegitimate business behavior for which
the discriminator should compensate his/her victim.
Filling the amorphous standard of good faith with antidiscrimina-
tion content should not present a problem of authority, thanks to the
broad social consensus that led to the enactment of the constitutional and
civil rights norms aimed at securing more equality. Moreover, as portrayed
here, the duty of good faith is expected to play its well-established role: to
serve as an "excluding" mechanism, one which defines and highlights
negative conduct which is unacceptable, rather than providing guidelines
for appropriate behavior. A similar ideology can be found in the more
specific Common Law "duty to serve" under which an owner of a store,
for example, is not allowed to discriminate between potential customers
and is required to serve them all on an equal basis.' s9 What is inspiring
about this analogy is that the duty to serve goes beyond the protection of
the victim and extends to condemnation of the business behavior of the
store-owner. Used this way, the Common Law doctrine functions as an
157. See also AYVEs, supra note 20, at 141-43 (discussing the use of consumer protec-
tion laws as a method to attack disparate treatment as "deceptive" misrepresentation).
158. Nih Cohen, Pre contractual Duties: Two Freedoms and the Contract to Negotiate, in
GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 25, 28 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Freidmann
eds., 1995).
159. See Williams, supra note 94, at 201-02; McCaw, supra note 152, at 205.
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educator no less than as a source of defense. If an analogous, but wider,
antidiscrimination message is going to be implemented through the doc-
trine of good faith, then such a message, coming from within contract law,
should sound loud and clear and hopefully be influential.
6 0
The problem is that here, in this context, the Article's focus on the
pre-contractual stage, as opposed to the contractual period, appears to make
the application of contractual tools more complicated. 16' The reason is
that it is not clear if and to what extent such a duty is recognized under
the American contractual doctrine. While many sound legal systems
around the world sustain and even expand a precontractual duty of good
faith in an effective and powerful manner that coexists with the market
and supports its functioning, American contract law appears to be hesitant
on this point. 
62
160. For the use of the doctrine of good faith as a tool for embracing equality into
contract law see, for example, Barak, supra note 121, at 159-64.
161. This might explain why the few calls for contractual coping with the issue only
applied their analysis to contractual situations. See, e.g., Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Race Real-
ism: Reclaiming the Antidiscrimination Principle through the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract
Law, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 455 (2005); Williams, supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
Prof. Harris has been skeptical toward proposals to use the doctrine of good faith in this
context. See Harris, supra note 97, 18-19. Part of her doubt emerges from the pre-
contractual problem of rejection from even participating in the contractual game. Id. With
respect to Williams's suggestion, see supra text accompanying notes 94-95, she writes:
For now, however, it would be impractical for ... victims to bring a claim un-
der contract law because it is unclear that the law will evolve to incorporate a
proscription against racial discrimination into the duty of good faith and fair
dealing. Moreover, even if such a change occurs, only a subset of... plaintiffs
would benefit from bringing claims under contract law, because customers
who were merely browsing in the store could arguably be characterized as
not yet engaged in the formation, performance, enforcement, or termination
of a contract.
Harris, supra note 97, 18-19.
162. For a description of the Israeli law approach see, for example, Aharon Barak, A
Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 93
(2002) ("Indeed, good faith constitutes one of the main tools with which I fulfill my role
as a judge. By virtue thereof, I have held that every power given to an individual in private
law should be exercised in good faith .... "). Barak, referring to Farnsworth's article, infra
note 163, notes that: "This concept has not yet been recognized as a general legal principle
in the United States." Id. at n.281. For a critical description of such an American approach
see Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During Precontractual Negotiations, 24
SErON HAL L. REv. 70,72-73 (1993).
Wall Street lawyers of world fame, echoed by their clients, told me that good
faith disclosures during negotiations are not required in the world of sophis-
ticated businessmen during negotiations in the United States. The concept of
good faith, they conceded, was not unknown, but its application was limited
to the phase of contract performance. During contract negotiations, neither
good faith dealing nor good faith disclosures was required, and everyone was
free to take advantage of the ignorance or misperceptions of another, no
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Nevertheless, more than a few have argued that the duty to negoti-
ate in good-faith or, at a minimum, an indirect weaker version thereof,
can also be found under the American law of contracts. 163 Among those
who believe in the existence of such duty, there seems to be no agree-
ment regarding its scope, but it is important to acknowledge a consensus
that the pre-contractual duty of good faith is significantly narrower than its
contractual counterpart.'6 4 Still, at least some of the writers have argued that
the American concept of negotiation in good faith is developing, and that




matter how unfair or unethical, except in the context of a special relation-
ship where the parties repose trust and confidence in each other (as, for
instance, in a fiduciary relation), which usually does not apply to arm's length
business transactions.
Id. at 72-73. The author discusses the extensive pre-contractual duty of good faith under
Italian law and German law and compares it to the American parallel approach. See id. at
73-76. It is maintained that: (a) the above description as made by the American lawyers is
far from exactly illustrating the American law; and (b) there is room under' American con-
tract law for a heightened duty of good faith and fair dealing in precontractual
negotiations. Id. For a comparative discussion of several different legal systems, and conclu-
sions with regard to the comparison between the English system and the Continental
system, see Nili Cohen, The Effect of the Duty of Good Faith on a Previously Common Law
System: The Experience of Israeli Law, in GOOD FAITH IN CONTRACT: CONCEPT AND CONTEXT
189, 194 (Roger Brownsword et al. eds., 1999) ("[Tjhe gap between the systems is not as
wide as might initially appear."); Palmieri, supra at 77 ("The Article will show that upon
closer scrutiny the concepts of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and of good faith
disclosures as understood in the United States, are not that dissimilar from those in the
nations of continental Europe .
163. See, e.g., James J. White, Good Faith and the Cooperative Antagonist, 54 SMU L.
REV. 679, 679 (2001) ("[N]o court, nor any academic writer, has ever been so bold or so
gauche as to suggest that good faith should not attend the obligations of parties under the
UCC."); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1743, 1811-13 (2000) (presenting cases in which the behavior of a party impelled
the court to impose a duty to negotiate in good faith, when such a commitment did not
arise from the agreement); E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agree-
ments: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. Rev. 217, 273-85 (1987) (tracing
types of behavior that the courts categorized as "unfair dealing" in precontractual negotia-
tions, including "Refusal to Negotiate" and "Breaking off Negotiations").
164. For an in-depth investigation of the contractual duty of good faith, done from a
standpoint of supporting a stronger concept of good faith in American contract law, see a
recent series of three articles by Prof. Houh: Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions:Toward
an Expansive Equality Approach to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1025 (2003) (focusing on at-will employment); Emily M.S. Houh, The Doctrine of
Good Faith in Contract Law: A (Nearly) Empty Vessel?, 2005 UTAH L. Rev. 1 (2005); Houh,
supra note 161. For a concise historical background of the immigration of good faith into
American law see Joel Iglesias, Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
to Franchises, 40 Hous. L. REV. 1423, 1426-27 (2004).
165. See Farnsworth, supra note 163, at 222.
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Other than conservatively following traditional concepts, the central
argument against the extrapolation of the duty of good faith from the
contractual to the pre-contractual stage lies in the fear of imposing liabil-
ity in the absence of consent. Under this line of reasoning, deeply rooted
in the classical Will Theory with its "meeting of the minds" model, the
main justification for inflicting a contractual good faith duty is not valid
when it comes to the process of contracting, especially where this process
proved fruitless. In a nutshell, the world of pre-contractual negotiations is
presumed to be liability-free, or, as put by the legendary Farnsworth:
"[T]his view of the precontractual period is what I call the common law's
'aleatory view' of negotiations: a party that enters negotiations in the
hope of the gain that will result from ultimate agreement bears the risk of
whatever loss results if the other party breaks off the negotiations.,
166
The general counter-argument questions the dichotomy of negotia-
tion/contract upon which the basic resistance is founded. As noted by
many contractual critiques and especially by the school of relational con-
tracts, the transition from pre-contract to contract has proven to be far less
dramatic and momentous than was believed under traditional doctrine.
Consequently, it would be wrong to imagine a twofold regime that moves
abruptly from "no-contract" to "contract" and accordingly from "no" to
"full" liability. The alternative view suggests a spectrum of mutual liabili-
ties growing gradually while corresponding to the intensity of the
connections between the parties. Indeed, this is an entrenched idea dating
back to Fuller and Perdue's seminal article that introduced the need and
justification for a "flexible scheme" of enforceability instead of an "all-or-
nothing theory.' 16' Applying this view to the duty of good faith would, of
course, subvert the belief that the duty exists, and should exist, only after
the contractual moment had arrived.
A full discussion of the pros and cons of extended precontractual li-
ability goes beyond the scope of this Article, and still it is meaningful to
note that with regard to the special focus on discrimination-one of the
main considerations that supports limited liability might actually lose its
strength. When writing against "European" levels of good faith, several
American scholars have argued that too much liability at too early a stage
of doing business would create a negative incentive to participate in the
marketplace, deterring people from engaging in an activity that carries
growing risks-what Farnsworth called "an undesirable chilling effect.""' 6
The assumption upon which such an argument is based is that full par-
ticipation in the preparations for entering the market, i.e. negotiations, is
valuable. It follows that while a chilling effect is harmful, an opposite
166. Farnsworth, supra note 163, at 221.
167. L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages
(2ndpart), 46 YAE LJ. 373, 419 (1937).
168. See Farnsworth, supra note 163, at 243; see also Ben-Shahar, supra note 19, at
1850-51.
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"warming effect" might be welcomed. Going back to discrimination, the
question is what might be the effect of using precontractual liability to
ban rejections from the market on the grounds of discrimination. Clearly
such a move is aimed at enabling more people to participate in the nego-
tiations and thereby improving their chances to achieve a contract and
enter the marketplace. From this perspective the specific content of a
good faith duty that commands equal treatment is predicted to have a
positive "warming effect." Certainly, such effect may be accompanied by
some degree of "chilling effect" on the side of the discriminators. But
even so, the main danger of shrinking market activities is weaker than in
any other debate regarding the desirability of precontractual liability.
Moreover, use of the broad standard of good faith, which is receptive
to judicial case-by-case interpretation, has several main advantages of
flexibility in comparison to the tyranny of formalities that many times fail
litigators under antidiscrimination rules.
169
Assuming that the duty of good faith can accommodate a ban of
discrimination, at least according to the more generous interpretations of
the scope of the precontractual liability under the American doctrine of
contracts, the question would be how to explain the decision to assign
contractual results to the rejection of someone for discriminatory reasons.
Another way to phrase this would be to inquire on what grounds of li-
ability can we lay this specific precontractual liability. The following
section offers to utilize the model of "no-retraction," structured by Omri
Ben-Shahar, as a possible reply.
B. The "No-Retraction" Basis of Liability
1.The No-Retraction Principle
As Prof. Patricia Williams waited at the doorstep of the apartment
she wanted to rent, the owner was walking towards her.' 70 They had spo-
ken earlier on the phone and were both making progress in the
negotiation process, getting closer, physically and metaphorically, to the
finalization of the contract. "She was walking briskly," Patricia tells, but
then she "caught sight of me, and slowed perceptibly. She walked slower
and slower and by the time she made it over to me, she refused to show
me the place, saying she had make a mistake and had decided to rent the
place to a man who 'could shovel the snow' in the winter.
' 
171
This is a story of a visible retraction from the negotiation. It is in
cases like these, I suggest, that the model of no-retraction can further sup-
port the proposal, made in the previous section, to view discriminatory
169. See supra Part I.E.
170. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
171. Id.
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refusals to contract as a breach of the duty to negotiate in good faith.1
72
That such support comes from the unexpected direction of "law and eco-
nomics" is especially valuable to the basic thesis that underlies the current
analysis: it provides further reason to believe that when considered under
a contractual "vocabulary," the egalitarian concerns will be seen as more
organic and legitimate, and less as a threat.'
73
The principle of "no-retraction" was recently introduced by Prof.
Ben-Shahar in an article of his, and is defined as offering "an alternative
to one of the pillars of contract law, that obligations arise only when there
is 'mutual assent'-when the parties reach consensus over the terms of the
transaction."' 74 As Ben-Shahar explains: A party who manifests a willing-
ness to enter into a contract at given terms should not be able to freely
retract from her manifestation. The opposing party, even if he did not
manifest assent, and unless he rejected the terms, acquires an option to
bind his counterpart to her representation or charge her with some liabil-
ity in case she retracts.175
Before delving into some of the nuanced arguments offered by Ben-
Shahar's analysis, it seems helpful to experiment somewhat intuitively
with the new idea.
Applying the above definition to Patricia Williams' apartment hunt
would mean that the landlady had no right to retract, and if she did
choose to do so she should be charged. Patricia was responding to an ad-
vertisement that in and of itself manifested an interest in entering into a
rental contract. As the location of the apartment was certainly known (re-
call that Patricia sat on its doorstep), and the rental fee was probably
discussed earlier over the phone, it seems that the landlady had manifested
the "willingness to enter into a contract at given terms" as required under
the no-retraction principle. Therefore, in accordance with the new ap-
proach, she "should not be able to freely retract from her manifestation.
1 76
172. It is important to realize that what is suggested by Ben-Shahar is a new basis for
contractual liability rather than a new doctrine. See generally Ben-Shahar, supra note 19.
Naturally, the proposed new basis has doctrinal applications, discussed in the second part of
the article. As pointed by Ben-Shahar one of the prominent applications is to "the re-
quirement to negotiate in good faith." Id. at 1860; see also infra notes 188-190 and
accompanying text.
173. By this I do not mean to imply two things: first, that law and economics cannot
and should not play a social role (it does!); and second, that the social problem explored
here has no economic implications (it does!). The main emphasis is, rather, that Ben-
Shahar's novel model was not originally designed with discrimination in mind or with an
inclination to fulfill distributional goals out of social concerns. See Ben-Shahar, supra note
19, at 1871. As Ben-Shahar himself concludes: "The analysis in this Essay focuses on one
type of justification for the no-retraction liability regime, namely, an economic justifica-
tion . Id.
174. Id. at 1829.
175. See id. at 1830.
176. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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Pragmatically, it means that Patricia should have the right to either en-
force the deal or be compensated for its loss.
2. The Basic Match
The new no-retraction approach is meant to provide "a systematic
foundation for one of the more ambiguous doctrines in contract law-
the requirement to negotiate in good faith."1 77 Accordingly, it is a theory
that was developed with the contractual tool proposed here in mind. Lit-
tle wonder, therefore, that it seems that the archetypical situation of
precontractual discrimination matches up seamlessly with the "no-
retraction" framework. It starts with the name. "Retraction," i.e. pulling
back, revoking, withdrawing, turning away,"' is precisely what the dis-
criminator does upon refusing to deal with the opposing party. But
beyond this, the approach works well with the events on both sides of the
contractual negotiation.
First, on the discriminators' side, a clear manifestation of the interest
in contracting is usually found. They are either repeat actors in the mar-
ketplace, such as store-owners, employers, caterers, etc., or occasional
visitors to the marketplace who came to do one-time business. In any
case, they are usually the initiators of the negotiations and therefore the
ones who not only have expressed a clear willingness to contract in gen-
eral but have also by and large dictated the first version of the contractual
terms. The last component is of major significance when it comes to the
no-retraction principle. The terms outlined by the discriminators reflect
their desired view of the planned transaction. This view, in turn, is a cru-
cial component for a no-retraction regime since its logic lies in the basic
notion that one can be bound to what one purported to seek. 179 Impor-
tantly, the no-retraction model is asymmetrical.180 It truly gives up the
need for mutual assent, and hence, all that is required for its implementa-
tion is an evident representation of the deal as desired by the party who
now seeks to retract.
Second, and as a result of the first point, the rejected party in dis-
criminatory situations is characteristically interested in the transaction that
177. Id. at 1860.
178. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://dictionary.oed.com.
179. Hypothetically, we can imagine a strategy that explicitly announces the dis-
criminatory "taste" of the businessperson who initiates the transaction, for instance by use
of the disgraceful signs which were used in the past to prevent entrance from members of
unwanted groups. However, given the social connotations of such a move, the likelihood
of an occurrence of this type is very low. More importantly, while the logic of using the
"no-retraction" will certainly lose its power, the behavior itself will be easier to defeat-
both under the duty to negotiate in good faith and under the current antidiscrimination
laws.
180. Ben-Shahar, supra note 19, at 1840.
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was offered and expects to be able to continue the negotiations.When the
moment of retraction arrives, it is seldom the terms of the deal that are at
issue. Since the retraction is caused by discrimination, what actually takes
place is the refusal of one party to continue negotiating and ultimately
contract with the other party because of the latter's "characteristics"-it
has nothing to do with the contractual terms. Therefore, the main diffi-
culty of giving up the traditional model of consensus-the concern of
suppressing the contractual will-is especially weak in the context of the
typical discrimination case.
3.The Unwanted Partner
The no-retraction principle offers a "general lens" through which to
look at a pattern of "contracts without consent.'" 8 The foremost manifes-
tation of waiver of consent, if precontractual discrimination is not to be
allowed, is the problematic creation of a contract with an unwanted part-
ner. The predicament is described by Ben-Shahar in economic terms of
"allocative inefficiency," in which "[p]arties might end up sticking with
unwanted contractual partners and, consequently, miss out on opportuni-
ties to maximize the potential surplus.- 18 2 Two replies are then evoked:
first, imposing liability does not necessarily mean compelled relation-
ship-one can always "buy" one's way out by compensating the unwanted
party (sharing the surplus brought by the later, preferred party with the
earlier, rejected one);1 83 and, second, while "it is true that the burden of
liability can lead to an ineffective choice of partner," the difficulty is less
severe than it might seem at first glance.
184
When the difficulty of the unwanted partner is transferred to the
discrimination arena, it seems to lose some of its inefficiency weight.
Thinking about Patricia Williams sitting on the doorstep and watching
the landlady slowing down, we must admit that there is an emotional ad-
vantage for the landlady in renting her place to a later, White partner
rather than to Patricia. Setting aside questions of morality, this sense of
being more "comfortable" with one's choice can be compared to the loss
of surplus discussed above. However, the expected loss from unwanted
partners appears, in this specific context, to be even smaller than the
"fairly small" loss predicted by Ben-Shahar.
One of the major differences is that the appearance of the later and
better partner can justify the retraction only in Ben-Shahar's exemplary
hypothesis. In the discrimination context, no later partner has arrived yet,
and the retraction is based upon an absolute rather than relative hostility
181. Id. at 1836.
182. Id. at 1852.
183. See id.
184. Id. at 1852-53.
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towards the first potential partner. Such hostility triggers the withdrawal,
irrespective of the possible appearance of a more attractive partner.
Another difference is that giving up a later partner who offers to pay
more, or to do more for the same consideration,"8" carries an objective loss
that can be easily translated into a wider social loss. Conversely, giving up
a later partner who is more desirable according to the first party's "taste"
represents a subjective loss. The personal contingency of such loss makes its
influence on society as a whole ambiguous and hard to measure. From an
aggregated social viewpoint, the "happiness" of the discriminator resulting
from the ability to reject an unwanted partner will be, at a minimum, off-
set by the harm to the excluded partner.
4. Further Implications
The two points explored above-the basic applicability of the no-
retraction regime to situations of discriminatory refusal to contract and
the problem of the unwanted partner-do not, of course, exhaust the im-
plications of applying the no-retraction model to precontractual
discrimination. Further exploration of the arguments that were raised in
support and in criticism of the new model indicates several additional
implications of applying the no-retraction model, which are especially
relevant in the present context.
First, the economic theory is brought into play in the discrimination
arena as a continuance of Ben-Shahar's work, which he concluded by say-
ing: "It remains for future work to explore the extent to which the
approach developed in this Essay has the horsepower to resolve pragmati-
cally the problems that have proven difficult for current doctrine and to
examine whether these solutions advance the various social objectives
associated with contract formation."' 18 6 These words are read here as recep-
tive enough to include the common precontractual problem of
discrimination. 187
185. See id. at 1852 ("[A] new partner appears, offering a transaction that is more
efficient....").
186. Id. at 1872.
187. In light of the quoted words, supra, it should be noted that this Article does not
attempt to estimate the general plausibility of the no-retraction principle, but rather, to use
it in one important context of one common precontractual problem. However, the sug-
gestion made here regarding the match between the issue of discrimination as a cause for
breaking the negotiations and the new regime does put forward a supportive view of the
latter. It is impossible to cover here the range of the general arguments regarding the "no-
retraction" principle. For commentary pieces that offer different critical views on the new
principle as defined by Ben-Shahar, supra note 19, see Jason S.Johnston, Investment, Informa-
tion, and Promissory Liability, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1923 (2004); Ronald J. Mann, Contracts-
Only with Consent, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1873 (2004); Daniel Markovits, The No-Retraction
Principle and the Morality of Negotiations, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1903 (2004). For Ben-Shahar's
FALL 2005]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
Second, although much ink has been spilled in debating the strict li-
ability constituted by the no-retraction principle, the new principle seems
to work best and to draw less criticism when the retraction has some de-
gree of wrongfulness to it."8 As pointed out by Prof. Markovits, when the
retraction is done in good faith the justification for imposing liability
needs to be better grounded. 89 However, when it comes to the discrimi-
nation discussed here, the wrongfulness as well as the bad faith seem
evident enough. Moreover, the unreasonable and irrational nature of the
retraction, which is to be found by Ben-Shahar in many retractions,190 is
especially apparent where the only motivation for breaking off the nego-
tiations is discrimination.
Third, as discrimination of the species discussed here often happens
while shopping, T9 or in other situations in which the negotiations are
relatively short, one might wonder how well it can be incorporated into
an approach that highlights negotiations as the basis for a "sliding scale of
liability." Here, it is worth noting that the harmonious nature of basic
match, discussed above, does not seem to be undermined by the brevity of
the negotiations. Remarkably, the "no-retraction" basis for liability is pre-
sented as capable of application at the early stages of the negotiations and
even in situations which might be seen as lacking negotiation alto-
gether.192 More specifically, the principle is even discussed with regard to
the contractual analysis of the process of responding to advertisements,
just as Patricia Williams did when she looked for an apartment to rent.
There too it is presented as apposite if, for instance, "the soliciting party
... does not fairly consider one of the bids.'
' 93
This position drew criticism of Ben-Shahar, accusing him of being
too hasty in applying his new approach. 9 4 However, it appears that apply-
ing such an extensive theory to a real-life problem such as discrimination
can teach a valuable lesson about the limited ability to abstractly define
the boundaries of negotiation. If, to use Patricia's example, an advertise-
ment is very specific and the interested party responds to it positively,
then an illegitimate breaking of the process of negotiation may occur de-
spite its restricted length. The length of the negotiation is surely one of
the indications for imposing liability, but it is definitely not the only one.
brief response, see Omri Ben-Shahar, Response: Mutual Assent Versus Gradual Ascent: The
Debate Over the Right to Retract, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1947 (2004).
188. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 19, at 1839 ("Liability under this approach, like tort
liability, results from a unilateral wrongful action of a party-in this case, retraction from a
representation.").
189. See Markovits, supra note 187, at 1912-13.
190. Ben-Shahar, supra note 19, at 1841-42.
191. See generally, e.g., Harris, supra note 97; Graves, supra note 61.
192. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 19, at 1843.
193. Id. at 1868.
194. See Markovits, supra note 187, at 1918.
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Another major factor that needs to be evaluated is the motivation for the
retraction: the more wrongful it is, the less the length of the negotiations
matters.
The fourth consideration is tightly connected to its predecessor, and
it concentrates on morality. Aptly, it is more developed outside of the eco-
nomic analysis offered by Ben-Shahar. Prof. Markovits dedicates a large
part of his critique to this philosophical aspect, maintaining that the no-
retraction regime leans on a deeper structure: the morality of the negotia-
tion relation. 195 Concisely, the argument as developed by Markovits assigns
moral value to the relationship between the parties to a contract. Follow-
ing the "special bond" theory of Joseph Raz' 96 and Bruce Ackerman's
"relational justice,'' 9 7 Markovits suggests that in order to add moral foun-
dation to the "no-retraction" principle it is essential to establish the
morality of the negotiation phase. In order to do this, Markovits asserts, it
is essential to have some level of relationship between the parties, and this,
in turn, dictates an inflexible definition of the negotiations.'98 This last
debate, over the scope of negotiations, was discussed earlier.1 99 What is im-
portant here is to notice the assigning of morality to the process that leads
to contract. Such a view emerges from the value of the relations that con-
tracts establish between those who engage in them.
This positive value is of great importance in the present context,
since the negative effect of discrimination lies precisely in the many
meanings of the denial of such a contract. Therefore, from the viewpoint
of a discriminated person, the emphasis on the morality of the relation-
ship that is created under negotiations is of immense importance. The
ability to be a part of negotiation, not to be exposed to harsh retraction
when one's otherness becomes evident, and to continue the negotiation
and ultimately to achieve a contract, are vital conditions to human contact
and social participation.
Finally, it is important to briefly point to the "consciousness raising"
potential of the "no-retraction" principle. Ben-Shahar observes that re-
placing the arbitrary liability impositions that cannot be explained under
the traditional consensus regime with an alternative basis will increase
predictability.2 ° Apart from its obvious economic value, predictability has
an educational power which correlates with this Article's call. People
should know in advance that discriminating against others who have
shown interest in their contractual "offer" (including invitations to offer)
is an act done in bad faith. They should become accustomed to the notion
195. See id. at 1913-21.
196. See Joseph Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF H.L.A HART 210 (P.M.S. Hacker &J. Raz eds., 1977).
197. See Bruce Ackerman, Temporal Horizons ofJustice, 94 J. PHIL. 299, 304-07 (1997).
198. See Markovits, supra note 187, at 1917.
199. See supra notes 191-194 and accompanying text.
200. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 19, at 1869.
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that discrimination constitutes illegitimate business behavior that is not
tolerated in the market and carries liability. Economists would say that it is
all about creating the right incentive not to discriminate, while philoso-
phers might put the spotlight on the morality of the negotiation process.
At any rate, thinking in terms of no-right-to-retract offers a sharp tool
that is capable of sending out the precise message.
In summing up the attempt to employ the innovative principle of
"no-retraction" in the precontractual discrimination context, a few words
about the relationship between tort law and contract law are due. Indeed,
this is an old and lengthy debate which once even led to the celebrated
announcement of The Death of Contract.201 While one can certainly doubt
its importance, especially if holding to a jurisprudence that generally re-
sists the classical tendency to treat legal categories religiously, it seems that
whenever precontractual problems are considered the argument that "this
is an issue of tort law" reappears. Here, the suggestion of a freestanding
contractual basis of liability with contractual logic and structure202 may
provide helpful armor to contractual arguments, which might be viewed
as intruding into tort law fields. More importantly, the primary distinction
between the tort and the contractual standards is that, to recover in tort,
one must show that the suspect behavior was intentional,20 3 which is, as
mentioned, the greatest obstacle faced by plaintiffs under the current
antidiscrimination laws. The proposed shift to an alternative contractual
framework has the advantage of removing this requirement and, in turn,
eliminates a major hurdle faced by potential plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
The present absence of contractual attention to the "freedom TO
contract," as defined here, is remarkable. The exact freedom upon which
the entire system relies is so trivialized that when people are discriminated
against by way of being deprived of this essential freedom, contract doc-
trine, in general, remains silent. In the meantime, the constitutional legacy
of the Thirteenth Amendment, understood broadly as a command to
abolish slavery to the point of equal economic and social possibilities for
all, is dispersed among numerous enactments in a patchwork that seems to
obscure the rather straightforward message.
This Article challenges the traditional boundaries between contract
doctrine, on the one hand, and the constitutional decree of the Thirteenth
201. GRANr GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 1995).
202. At least one of the "no-retraction" critiques has argued that this is exactly where
the theory is overstated. See Markovits, supra note 187, at 1912-13.
203. See, e.g., Michelle Oberman, Sex, Lies and the Duty to Disclose, 47 Ariz. L. Rev.
871 (forthcoming 2005) (presenting the same advantage of contractual norms over tort
norms in the context of imposing a duty to disclose relevant information in agreements
between intimates).
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Amendment and the cluster of antidiscrimination laws, on the other hand.
In doing so it seeks to end the "separate but equal" manner of discussing
the situation: thinking about discrimination as if no contracts are involved
while analyzing contracts as if no problem of discrimination exists. It is to
this traditional division that the Article responds by suggesting a new
form of discourse: contractual discourse that takes into account constitu-
tional concerns; "private" law that takes care of "public" issues.
Undeniably, such a call cannot constitute a comprehensive discus-
sion. Rather, it is designed more towards opening scholarly discussion of
the possibility of constitutional content as an integral part of contract
doctrine. In this context it is important to emphasize that the current ex-
ploration is in addition to, and not instead of, the treatment of
discrimination under the current laws. Whatever the flaws of the present
cluster of laws may be, the argument made here does not focus on what
to do with them.2 4 Instead, what is developed herein is an alternative
claim that derives its power from being internal to the contractual way of
thinking and from being described in contractual terms. Ultimately, how-
ever, this alternative not only offers a better understanding of the issue of
precontractual discrimination; hopefully, it can also add a legal tool which
is more flexible, less deterring and not dependent upon the tricky re-
quirement of proving the discriminators' intentions.
Several practical implications of the suggested alternative remain
open for trial. The most important is the complex question of remedies.
As mentioned earlier, some current litigated cases were extremely success-
ful in terms of the amount of damages handed down against the
discriminator. °s Contractual claims, on the other hand, will probably yield
lower levels of damages, even under a remedial approach that affords
compensation for non-monetary injuries and perhaps also includes some
level of "punitive" damages. While this might become a disadvantage, it
could also prove beneficial by making it easier and less deterring for
204. But see supra Part I.E.
205. See, for example, Deseriee A. Kennedy, Processing Civil Rights Summary Judgment
and Consumer Discrimination Claims, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 989,989-1012 (2004), for a discus-
sion of Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18471 (N.D. Tex. 2001), a case in
which a jury awarded the plaintiffs damages of $550,000 as compensation for the rude
treatment they were exposed to in the defendant's gas station. The damages were later
denied on appeal, but the potential of having to pay those phenomenal amounts of money
causes many defendants to settle cases by paying enormous amounts of money, especially
in cases that have survived summary judgment. Id. See Williams v. Staples, Inc., 372 F.3d
662 (4th Cir. 2004), for a good example of such dynamics. In this case, Staples agreed to
pay Williams the sum of $50,000 after losing the battle over a summary judgment. Id. Yet
another recent example is clothing retailer Abercrombie & Fitch's agreement to pay $50
million to settle lawsuits claiming it discriminates against minorities and women. See Aber-
crombie & Fitch Settles Discrimination Suit, NPR announcement, http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=4174147.
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courts, which might be prone to dismiss fewer cases than they tend to do
under the current regime with its dramatic consequences.
Another concern that necessitates some experience with the con-
tractual approach relates to the influence law might have on society. The
reconstruction and repositioning endeavors that are made here are done
with business activity and with market actors in mind. Ultimately the
hope is to convince potential discriminators that discrimination consti-
tutes wrong business behavior. In this light, and given the fact that
discrimination is awfully stubborn, the question is: will the message be
received?
Finally, and on a different level, this Article can also be read as a case
study on the broader issue of legal borders. Read this way, it has the po-
tential of suggesting the mutual benefit that both "public" and "private"
discourses can gain from crossing over one into the other. Creating an
integrated discourse of the sort experimented with here has the potential
of fundamentally improving the legal treatment of problems that have
social and economic components.
Returning to the starting point of this Article, the example of baseball
hero Jackie Robinson beautifully illustrates the difference that being refused
a contract or being offered one can make. Branch Rickey, the general man-
ager of the Brooklyn Dodgers, offered Robinson a contractual opportunity
never before afforded Black players and eventually made him the first
Black baseball player to play in the Major Leagues, breaking the historic
segregation between the Negro Leagues and the Major Leagues.2 6 This
ability to make a contract that was previously denied meant so much
more than just a contract. It was the key to economic and social participa-
tion, a symbol of integration, a fulfillment of the constitutional promise of
equality.
206. See, e.g., Louis Effirat, Of Skill and Courage, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 10, 1947, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/sports/year-in_sports/04.10.html ("Jackie Robin-
son, 28-year-old infielder, today became the first Negro to achieve major-league baseball
status in modern times. His contract was purchased from the Montreal Royals of the
International League by the Dodgers .... "); Baseball, the Color Line, and Jackie Robinson,
available at The Library of Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/
robinson/jr1940.html:
After scouting many players from the Negro Leagues, Branch Rickey met
with Jackie Robinson at the Brooklyn Dodgers office in August, 1945. Clyde
Sukeforth, the Dodgers scout, had told Robinson that Rickey was scouting
for players because he was starting his own [B]lack team to be called the
Brown Dodgers. At the meeting, Rickey revealed that he wanted Robinson
to play for the major league Dodgers. Rickey then acted out scenes Robin-
son might face to see how Robinson would respond. Robinson kept his
composure and agreed to a contract with Brooklyn's Triple-A minor league
farm club, the Montreal Royals. On October 23, 1945,Jackie Robinson offi-
cially signed the contract.
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On March 2, 2005,Jackie Robinson was posthumously awarded the
Congressional Gold Medal.2 7 When Robinson was nominated for this
award, the highest that Congress can give to a civilian, Senator John Kerry
told his colleagues that Robinson's signing by the Dodgers was so signifi-
cant because it "engaged the American people in a constructive
conversation about race.' 20 8 Robinson's story, so much a part now of the
American heritage, and particularly the "constructive conversation" it of-
fered to the American people, illustrates this Article's response to the
question posed in the title. Contract doctrine definitely does have, and
should have, something constitutional to say, and it is about the indispen-
sability of the freedom TO contract.
207. See, e.g., Jackie Robinson Awarded Congressional Gold Medal, NPR an-
nouncement, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4519521.
208. Barry M. Bloom, Robinson to Receive Congressional Gold Medal, www.MLB.com,
Jan. 31, 2005, http://mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/news/search-archive.jsp (search "News
and Features" for "January" "2005"; then follow "Robinson's contributions recalled" hy-
perlink). I am indebted to my dear friend Danny Evron for pointing this out to me just as
I was completing this Article.
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